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I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation is becoming a vital part of family legal problem solv-
ing and is creating new challenges for the lawyer practicing in the
family law setting. The American Bar Association, the Association
of Family and Conciliation Courts and others recently have pro-
posed standards of behavior for mediators where none have existed
before.1 States also have attempted to define the appropriate realm
of ethical practice for family mediation.'
Within the family law setting, a tension exists between the
state's primary goal of ordering family relationships and the state's
adversarial divorce process that dissolves those relationships. The
adversarial divorce process, involving a lawyer guided by adver-
sarial ethics, frustrates the ability of divorcing spouses to fulfill
their family legal obligations mandated by the state. Consequently,
the mediated divorce has evolved as an alternative mechanism that
promises to be more consistent with the state's primary goals for
the family. The mediation process, like the adversarial process,
necessarily generates a framework of ethical practice. Specifically,
lawyers in family dissolution mediation should have an ethical ob-
ligation to facilitate the post-dissolution division of family respon-
sibilities. This article proposes a value system of facilitative ethics
that encourages mediation participants to work out post-dissolu-
1. These standards were drafted by a group of individuals and associations from differ-
ent professions. Many groups had developed their own standards for mediation practice and
several of the drafters paticipated in the promulgation of more than one set of standards.
The standards can be found in the following sources: STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR DIVORCE
MEDIATORS (19-) reprinted in 2 Dispute Resolution F. 5 (1984) [hereinafter ABA STAN-
DARDS]; Bishop, Standards for Family and Divorce Mediation, 2 Dispute Resolution F. 3
(1984); see also MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (Asso-
ciation of Family and Conciliation Courts, 19_) reprinted in 22 CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 1
(1984) [hereinafter AFCC STANDARDS]; Note, Standards of Practice for Family Mediators,
17 Far. L.Q. 455 (1984).
2. See infra notes 157-205 and accompanying text.
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tion arrangements that promote continuing cooperation and fulfill
the state's primary goal of ordering family relationships.
Although the underlying purpose of this article is to promote the
use of mediation, the article focuses on the ethical values a lawyer
should demonstrate when using legal counseling skills in divorce
mediation. The premise is that the lawyer's ethical standards are
framed by the mediation process and family law as it affects sepa-
rating spouses.
First, this article considers the classic family dissolution process
and the necessary use of traditional adversary ethical values in this
process. Second, the article reviews the literature which discusses
mediation and the ethical dilemmas engendered by mediation.
Third, the article considers what principles should form the basis
for ethics in the mediation process. Two proper sources of these
principles will be explored-the range of possibilities shaped by
the mediation process itself, and the necessity of effecting society's
goals for the family. It will be argued that these sources suggest an
ethical framework which facilitates the fulfillment of post-dissolu-
tion family obligations. These facilitative principles will be used to
critique the proposed mediation standards. Finally, this article
urges that the legal profession, under the leadership of the organ-
ized bar, seriously consider the idea that a lawyer engaged in the
unique role of family mediator has ethical duties shaped by the
mediation process in the family law setting. In so doing, the author
hopes to present a model for attorneys working to facilitate the
fulfillment of their clients' legal and moral family obligations.
II. THE FAMILY LAW SETTING
A. The Divorce Arena
The traditional role of the family is to provide each member
with financial, material and emotional support within the family
unit, and to prepare each family member to function as an inde-
pendent, productive member of society.3 Furthermore, the family
unit, when viewed as an economic enterprise accumulating wealth
and property, provides society with a mechanism for ordering
property rights. For example, at marital dissolution, courts have
3. For a discussion on the essential functions of the family, see W. GOODE, THE FAMILY
(1982); Hobbs, We Are Family: Changing Times, Changing Idealogies and Changing Law,
14 CAP. U. L. REV. 511, 519-24 (1985).
4. See generally UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A U.L.A. 109 (1987); The Uniform Mar-
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divided businesses,5 pensions,' and inherited wealth.7 In addition,
though a professional degree is not subject to division at divorce,
courts have ordered reimbursement alimony to a spouse who has
contributed financially toward the other spouse's education.,
The principle issues in a divorce are the care and custody of chil-
dren, support for a needy..spouse and property distribution. The
task of the participants in the divorce process (spouses, lawyers
and judge) is to seek an equitable resolution which accommodates
the state's primary goals, yet respects the vital interests of each
participant. The state has a vital interst in the parties not only
during marriage, but also after marital dissolution:
We have heretofore held that the authority to regulate marriages
and correspondingly to provide for their dissolutions is vested in the
Legislature. It is inherent in the state's police power to do so in the
regulation of society and its relationships, including the very essen-
tial and important family relationship within marriage. The mar-
riage contract perhaps more than any other has a vital and essential
effect on the very life and society of the State and therefore is a very
proper subject of th6 state's police power; the subject of marriage
(and correspondingly the dissolution thereof) has a very definite
bearing upon the public interest with which the Legislature is con-
cerned and charged with its regulation."
ital Property Act: New Concepts for Divorce Lawyers, 12 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001 (Dec.
10, 1985) (discussing the impact of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act on Community
property-based divorce law).
5. See Chaachou v. Chaachou, 135 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1961) (divorce on grounds of cruelty
where wife awarded a special equity in value of four hotels).
6. For an analysis of cases dealing with retirement benefits, see J. KRAUSKOPF, CASES ON
PROPERTY DIVISION AT MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION, 119-36 (1984); see also Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, title X, 96 Stat. 718, 730 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (providing for retirement and other benefits for
married members of the armed forces).
7. For an analysis of problems connected with the distribution of inherited property on
divorce, see J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 6, at 151-59.
8. See Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982) (a spouse who supported the other
spouse who was in school is entitled to fair compensation when the marriage is dissolved
before the contributing spouse is able to realize the expected benefits); Mahoney v. Maho-
ney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982) (Earning potential provided by a degree or license is
not marital property subject to division at divorce; however, when one spouse contributes
toward the other spouse's education with the expectation of increased income and marital
benefits, reimbursement alimony can be awarded at divorce.); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106
A.D.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985) (Where spouse had contributed to advance the other
spouse's career and where virtually no material property existed for equitable distribution,
the court awarded the contributing spouse rehabilitation and maintenance alimony, taking
into consideration the other spouse's future increased earning capacity.).
9. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 273 (Fla. 1973) (footnotes omitted); see also Posner v.
[Vol. 22:325
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The state's interest in facilitating an equitable resolution is re-
flected in the language of Florida's marital dissolution statute
which expresses the following goals:
(1) This chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its purposes.
(2) Its purposes are:
(a) To preserve the integrity of marriage and to safeguard meaning-
ful family relationships;
(b) To promote the amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen
between parties to a marriage; and
(c) To mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children
caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage.10
The state's interest in terminating a marriage is to facilitate a
non-traumatic disengagement.1 Moreover, "[p]ublic policy de-
mands that when a marriage relationship is terminated, each party
shall be placed in a position to rehabilitate himself and start anew,
completely free of the former spouse. The decree of divorce is a
conclusive presumption that the possibility of restoring the marital
status is gone forever.' 1 2 The marriage dissolution process strives,
not always successfully, to achieve this public policy.
B. The Consequences of Divorce-An Example
Of the many issues that arise at marital dissolution, none are
more challenging than those involving the care and custody of chil-
dren. This is especially true in jurisdictions which require or
strongly endorse joint custody 3 or shared parental responsibility. 4
Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970) (A divorce cannot be awarded by consent of the
parties because of the state's interest in the preservation of marriage, however, the court
upheld an antenuptial agreement concerning the limitation of a spouse's right to alimony.),
afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 315 So. 2d 175 (1975); Ex parte Lovier, 156 Fla. 147, 23 So. 2d
272 (1945) (state is interested in divorce and the custody of minor children); accord May-
nard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (rights and obligations in marriage and divorce depend
upon state law).
10. FLA. STAT. ANN § 61.001 (West Cum. Supp. 1987).
11. "We recognize that the new 'no fault' concept was a principle basis of the new legis-
lation for a desired simplification of the procedure aimed at reducing the trauma of the
dissolution experience." Ryan, 277 So. 2d at 273.
12. Martin v. Martin, 157 Fla. 456, -, 26 So. 2d 183, 184 (1946).
13. See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981). But see Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that custody of younger children is awarded to the parent
who is the primary caretaker, i.e., the parent who exercises the most parenting skills in the
day-to-day care of the child).
1988] 329
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Here it is incumbent on both parents to work together, raising
their children under less than ideal circumstances. Although a full
examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, one
example might illustrate the consequences engendered by marital
dissolution.
In the case of Azzara v. Waller,15 two parents litigated whether
their eight-year-old daughter's surname should be changed to the
surname taken by the mother upon remarriage. The mother, who
had primary custody, petitioned for the name change.' 6 The father,
who had visitation privileges and resided in New York, filed a
counterclaim "to enjoin the mother from allowing or encouraging
the child to be known by any surname other than his.' 7 Each
party had an expert witness who lent support to their own posi-
tion. ' Mary Beth, the child whose name was in controversy, was
reported to be "very disinterested (she said 'bored')"' 9 in the whole
affair. As to Mary Beth's resolution of the issue the court found:
Apparently she uses the name 'Waller' around Dade County and
the name 'Azzara' when she is with her father. It also appears clearly
that she warmly loves her mother, her father and her step-father,
and feels very secure in their love for her. She refers to both her
father and her step-father as 'Daddy' and when she feels it neces-
sary to distinguish between them, refers to her father as her 'Daddy
in New York' and her step-father as her 'Daddy here'.
20
The court decided that the controlling standard should be the
welfare of the child: "[A] change of a minor's surname over the
14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (2)(b)(2) (West Cune. Supp. 1987). For a thoughtful
discussion on the concept of shared parental responsibility in the legal and physical custody
of the child, see Note, Shared Parental Responsibility: Florida Statutes Section 61.13, 7
NOVA. L.J. 277 (1983).
15. 495 So. 2d 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
16. Id. at 277-78.
17. Id. at 278.
18. The psychologist who testified on behalf of the mother urged "that it was his profes-
sional philosophy that all children should have the same name as the family they live with
.... [C]hildren [think] a different name means something is wrong and therefore feel
guilty." Id.
The psychologist for the father alternatively claimed that "[iun his opinion changing the
child's name to Waller [the mother's surname] would cause estrangement from her natural
father and would eliminate her current freedom to use either the name 'Waller' or the name





objection of one parent [should be ordered] only where the evi-
dence affirmatively shows that such change is necessitated by the
welfare of the child."21
The court did not find affirmative evidence that Mary Beth's
welfare necessitated a name change.2 2 In fact, the court deferred to
the real expert in this controversy, Mary Beth, and declared that
[I]t would be contrary to the best interests of Mary Beth for this
Court to... in any way fetter Mary Beth's freedom to use which-
ever surname with which she feels the most comfortable. When her
surname becomes important to her, she can decide this issue for her-
self and leave this Court to decisions with which it feels much more
comfortable.
23
This case illustrates two important concerns which are at the
center of a family dissolution. First, the court is generally not
"comfortable" with making these kinds of decisions. It is more
comfortable with structuring the general outlines of a custody ar-
rangement.24 As long as the child's welfare is not endangered, the
state has no real interest in the day-to-day details of child rearing,
even when the child rearers are no longer living together.25 The
details of custody are better left to the parents.2 "
The second concern is implicated by the first. At stake in Azzara
(indeed in most family dissolution cases with children) were the
primary family interests of the individuals involved-the two par-
21. Id. (citing Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)).
22. Id. at 279. Interestingly, one of the sub-issues in the case was whether changing a
female child's name was important. The expert for the mother "seemed to believe that
changing Mary Beth's surname now was of diminished importance because she is a girl and
will change her name by marriage in a few years in any event." Id. But the judge recognized
that in our modern society, women do not always change their names upon marriage. Id. In
fact, the judge noted that Mrs. Waller "testified-with justifiable pride-that her name is
'Jane Huckaby Waller."' Id. "Huckaby" was Mrs. Waller's maiden name.
23. Id.
24. See sources cited supra note 14.
25. See Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1835-39 (1985) (discussing the history of the legal tradition of non-
interference in day-to-day affairs of the family).
26. Child custody disputes are perfectly suited for mediation. No doubt the Azzara case
would have been settled more expeditiously and with less cost if handled through a compe-
tent mediator. See generally GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS
AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 162-210 (1986); Saposnek, Strategies in Child Custody
Mediation: A Family Systems Approach, 2 MEDIATION Q. 29 (Dec. 1983); Saposnek, What is
Fair in Child Custody Mediation?, 8 MEDIATION Q. 9 (June 1985).
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ents and the child. The foremost concern was the best interests of
the child, Mary Beth. She, however, was "disinterested and puz-
zled" by all the fuss. In fact, she had already worked out a way to
cope with being in two families with different names.
In Azzara, the mother's interest derives either from the custody
responsibilities imposed upon her by the dissolution process, or
from her personal desire to make a statement about the way she
lives her life.28 In the first instance, as the person with primary
custody in a shared parental responsiblity jurisdiction, she has the
task of handling the day-to-day activities.2 Practically speaking, it
is much easier to manage a household if all of the members use the
same surname, especially in school.30 Also, the possible embarass-
ment of having to explain family circumstances is reduced. From
this point of view, the name change request had some validity.
Alternatively, the mother might want her child to benefit from
the social status obtained by her new husband, "a prominent at-
tortney."' Arguably, she would merely be seeking the best for her
child through social positioning. Finally, the action could be in-
spired by a personal desire to bury her past marriage completely
and get on with a new life. However, at this point, the continuing
interest of the father in the companionship of his daughter must
be considered.
32
For the father in Azzara, divorce cut the marital bond but had
not terminated his parental rights. Moreover, award of primary
custody to his former spouse had cut the direct parental tie of
daily involvement. The father's relationship with his daughter was
further strained by geographic distance. As the father's expert wit-
ness suggested, the changing of the surname "would cause
estrangement.""3
27. Azzara, 495 So. 2d at 278. Children face a severe challenge in surviving the dissolu-
tion of their parents' marriage. See GARDNER, supra note 26, at 162-210; see also M.
WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN (1980).
In Azzara, much wisdom came from the "mouths of babes." Dr. Robert Kline, the father's
expert witness noted that "Mary Beth's discretion to use the surname of either 'Waller' or
'Azzara' should remain unfettered by either judicial pronouncement or parental pressure
.... 'She knows that she has two names that represent the families she loves very much.'"
Azzara, 495 So. 2d at 278.
28. See supra Section VI.2E.
29. Florida presumes that both parents should be responsible for raising the children.
See sources cited supra note 14.
30. See Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
31. Azzara, 495 So. 2d at 279.




At a time when many fathers are defaulting on child support
payments 34 and visitation schedules, the state should not en-
courage paternal drop-out, but should facilitate a father's involve-
ment to an extent not inconsistent with the fulfillment of tasks by
the primary custodian.
C. Summary
The law imposes legal obligations on individuals formhiig fami-
lies which may continue after marital dissolution. If society is seri-
ous about enforcing familial obligations, then family law, family
lawyers and the familial dispute resolution mechanisms should ad-
dress these obligations in terms which facilitate their fulfillment.
Specifically, if parents are charged during marriage with the care
(physical, emotional and spiritual) of their progeny, then the
processes which order post-marital custody and support obliga-
tions should be designed to facilitate the discharge of these obliga-
tions as well. Similarly, if marriage is deemed to be an emotional
and economic partnership, then partnership concepts should be
employed in the distribution of marital property. 5
III. FAMILY DISSOLUTION PROCESS: THE ADVERSARIAL SETTING
The adversarial nature of the divorce process does not lend itself
to achieving the fulfillment of post-divorce obligations.36 There is
34. The severity of the nonpayment problem was reported in Lauter, The Custody Sup-
port Crises, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27, 1984, at 1.
[N]on-compliance currently amounts to a $4 billion annual arrearage bill, according
to recent congressional testimony. Census Bureau figures show that fewer than half of
those custodial parents who do receive awards actually get the amount coming to
them. For the rest, enforcement efforts face crowded court calendars that often mean
months of delay before a hearing, as well as a legal system that makes its easy to
frustrate an enforcement action.
Id. at 45; see also D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979).
35. See UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY AcT § 4, 9A U.LA 109 (1987); see also Glendon, The
New Family and the New Property, 53 TuL. L. RE V. 697 (1979); Oldham, Is the Concept of
Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J. FAM. L. 263 (1984).
36. See GARDNER, supra note 26, at 19.
The adversary system, which professes to help parents resolve their differences, is
likely to intensify the hostilities that it claims it is designed to reduce. It provides the
litigants with ammunition that they may not have realized they possessed. It contrib-
utes to an ever-increasing vicious cycle of vengeance-so much so that the litigation
may bring about greater psychological damage than the pains and grief of the mar-
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an inherent tension between the state divorce process and the
state's primary goals for the family. Divorce wreaks havoc in the
lives of the individuals involved, 37 and the adversarial divorce pro-
cess intensifies this turmoil. The couple whose united love resulted
in the birth of chilren now fight with dogged determination to ob-
tain "possession" of their offspring." Liberalized property distri-
bution schemes provide additional incentives to battle.39 The spoils
of this legal battle are obtained at great emotional and psychologi-
cal cost to the participants.40
The ethics of adversarial lawyers are shaped by their role in es-
corting their clients across the marital dissolution battleground. 1
They protect the client's rights and shield him or her from emo-
tional and economic exploitation by the "other" side.42 The lawyer
riage that originally brought about the divorce. Although some attorneys are genu-
inely appreciative of the vicious effects of protracted litigation and recognize the ter-
rible psychological trauma that may result from adversary proceedings, other lawyers
are not. For the latter, the name of the game is to "win". They believe their reputa-
tions rest on their capacity to win and they fear that if they appear to be moderate
and conciliatory they will lose clients.
Id.
37. See generally D. CHAMBERS, supra note 34; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARING
HOUSE PUB. 78, A GROWING CRISIS: DISADVANTAGED WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN (1983);
Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs on Women 6
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1983); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic
Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181
(1981).
38. See GARDNER, supra note 26, at 19.
People involved in custody litigation are fighting. They are fighting for their most
treasured possessions-their children. The stakes are extremely high. Litigation over
money, property and other matters associated with the divorce produce strong feel-
ings or resentment and anger. However, they are less likely to result in reactions of
rage and fury than are conflicts over the children. Children are the extensions of our-
selves, our hopes for the future, and thereby closely tied up with our own identities.
Fighting for them is almost like fighting for ourselves. The two may become indistin-
guishable, and the fight becomes a 'fight of life.'
Id.; see also Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); Baker
& Seiler, How to Recover a Missing Child After a Parental Kidnap, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1986, at
57.
39. See sources cited supra note 35.
40. See GARDNER, supra note 26, at _; J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980); R. WEISS, GOING IT
ALONE: THE FAMILY LIFE AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS OF THE SINGLE PARENT (1983); Peterson,
Leigh & Day, Family Stress Theory and the Impact of Divorce on Children, 7 J. OF DI-
VORCE 1 (1984).
41. For a general discussion of ethics in the adversary system, see M. FREEDMAN, LAW-
YER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
(1978); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
WIs. L. REV. 30 (1978).
42. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, EC 7-1 (1981).
334
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zealously strives to capture the better position for his client in the
realms of property division, child custody and support monies.
43
In this scenario, a lawyer's ethics are governed by the classic at-
torney-client relationship in the adversarial legal system.44 The
ethics of the adversarial process dictate uncompromised loyalty to
the client.45 The client's cause is to be pursued zealously within the
bounds of the law.46 Secrets and confidences are to be shared with
In discussing the lawyer's role in adversarial divorce litigation, Gardner makes the follow-
ing observation:
C. Sopkin describes in dramatic terms how sordid and sadistic such litigation can
be. He focuses particularly on the role of attorneys in intensifying and prolonging
such conflicts. In his article "The Roughest Divorce Lawyers in Town" he describes a
brand of attorney often referred to in the field as a "bomber." Sopkin quotes one
such bomber (Raoul Lionel Felder, a New York City divorce attorney) as saying: "If
it comes to a fight, it is the lawyer's function using all ethical, legal and moral means
to bring his adversary to his knees as fast as possible. Naturally, within this frame-
work the lawyer must go for the "soft spots." The kinds of antics that such lawyers
utilize and promulgate are indeed hair-raising. One husband is advised to hire a gig-
olo to seduce his wife into a setting where a band of private detectives are engaged to
serve as witnesses. Another husband is advised to get his English-born wife deported
because she is not yet a citizen.
GARDNER, supra note 26, at 21 (citing C. Sopkin, The Toughest Divorce Lawyers in Town,
New York (Nov. 4, 1974)).
43. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY Canon 7, EC 7-1 (1981); see also
Schneider v. Richardson, 411 A.2d 656 (Me. 1979).
44. See sources cited supra note 41.
45. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmITY EC 5-1.
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of
the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and
loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires
of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
Id.; see also id. EC 5-21.
46. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY Canon 7, EC 7-1 (1981). But see The
Florida Bar v. Wendel, 254 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1971). The attorney in Florida Bar was charged
with misconduct in handling a divorce matter. The attorney presented the Final Judgment
of Divorce which indicated that the divorcing parties had agreed that custody of the child
would go to the husband (attorney's client). Unbeknownst to the court, the attorney and his
client had entered into a secret agreement with the wife by which she would have actual
child custody. By having an official record awarding custody to the husband, the attorney
was able to preserve his client's exemption from the U.S. Selective Service System draft.
The Florida Supreme Court found that:
The record before us shows Respondent to be a young, enthusiastic attorney with a
good reputation in his community. . . but who in this isolated instance was overzeal-
ous in his attempt to serve his client. While we certainly do not condone his action,
and we agree it was unethical for him to keep from the trial judge the intention to
have the secret agreement executed, we do not feel he should be suspended or dis-
barred due to the extenuating circumstances. He received no pecuniary gain from his
actions other than the usual divorce fee.
Id. at 202. The attorney received a public reprimand and "two years probation, during
which time he [was] not to handle dissolution of marriage cases . . . ." Id.
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the opposing side only with the knowledge and consent of the cli-
ent.47 It is impermissible for a lawyer to advocate a generous, equi-
table settlement offer if the best interests of the client require
seeking a less costly result, even though it would be less fair to the
former spouse.48
In sum, the adversarial divorce process sets up a system of win-
ners and losers.49 Victories count more than seeking peaceful coex-
istence where individuals rebuild their lives and still fulfill family
obligations.
IV. FAMILY DISSOLUTION PROCESS: THE MEDIATION SETTING
A. The Goals of Mediation
New approaches must be developed which minimize the horrible
consequences the adversarial process has on marital dissolution.
Fortunately, recent changes in the practice of divorce law suggest
that solutions are being found.50 For couples facing divorce, media-
tion of the dissolution by a trained mediator is an increasingly
47. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101, EC 4-1, EC 4-2 (1981).
48. The lawyer's perception of his role ... affects how the client's interests are served.
Dr. H. O'Gorman chronicles the distinctly different attitudes among attorneys, which
he characterizes, in summary, as presenting those of either the advocate or counselor.
The advocate sees his job as getting the "best deal" for the client, and is apt to per-
ceive this as mainly an economic issue. One divorce lawyer's answer to O'Gorman's
inquiry as to his role was that "in matrimonial cases clients are primarily interested
in money. If you represent the wife, then your job is to get as much as possible for
her. If you represent the husband pay out as little as possible."
The counselors, on the other hand, are more inclined to help the clients make decisions.
[T]hey would attempt to induce the client to make what they thought was the "right"
decision.
Chang, Nonadversarial Representation: Rule 2.2 and Divorce Mediation, in A STUDY OF
BARRIERS TO THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 111, 119 (1984)
(citing H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 135 (1963)).
49. Gardner considers the psychological costs of adversarial battle:
Unfortunately, many such well-meaning couples, in spite of every attempt to avoid
such a catastrophe, gradually descend into the same kind of psychologically devastat-
ing experience. An important contributing element to such unfortunate deterioration
relates to the anger and rage engendered by their having involved themselves in pro-
tracted adversary proceedings. The system fosters sadism. The aim of simply winning
often degenerates into one in which each side is bent on depleting the other of funds,
producing psychological deterioration, or even destroying the other party. The result,
however, is most often a Pyrrhic victory in which both sides lose, even though one
may ostensibly be the winner.
GARDNER, supra note 26, at 25.
50. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1982) [hereinafter cited as ALTERNATIVE MEANS].
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popular choice. Divorce mediation is less expensive, limits the
amount of legal bloodshed, and better promotes an amicable
split. 1 Instead of frustrating the fulfillment of family obligations,
mediation allows couples to craft their own solutions defining their
own responsibilities.52
Jay Folberg defines mediation as follows:
Divorce mediation is a non-therapeutic process by which the parties,
together with the assistance of a neutral resource person or persons,
attempt to systematically isolate points of agreement and disagree-
ment, explore alternatives and consider compromises for the pur-
pose of reaching a consensual settlement of issues relating to their
divorce or separation. It is a process of conflict resolution and man-
agement which returns to the parties responsibilities for making
their own decisions about their own lives.
53
The mediation process is designed to achieve the following goals:
(1) help the parties learn to communicate, (2) help the parties
learn to work together, (3) isolate issues to be decided, (4) help the
parties cooperate for positive gains, and (5) handle the legal issues
with minimum state intervention .5  In sum, family mediation facil-
itates each person's compliance with his or her primary legal obli-
gations upon divorce.
51. For a comprehensive discussion of the mediation process, see F. BIENENFELD, CHILD
CUSTODY MEDIATION (1983); R. FISHER & W. UREY, GETrING TO YES (1981); J. FOLBERG & A.
TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION
(1984); C. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS (1986).
52. Some experts advocate an approach to mediation which emphasizes cooperation and
fairness as necessary ingredients to lasting post-marital agreements and downplays adver-
sarial techniques by:
[s]howling] ways in which a separating or divorcing couple can be encouraged to co-
operate and design solutions based on needs, abilities, and aptitudes, rather than on
fault and blame. Resolutions derived from strength will be more vital and longlasting
than those arrived at through weakness and fault. Moreover, this method both ad-
dresses immediate needs and also helps the couple to look forward to separate and
independent features through its practical orientation and commitment to maximiz-
ing opportunities for all parties in the years to come. It thereby enables the couple to
continue their relationship as parents in as positive and respectful a way as possible.
The Carrot Instead of the Stick: A More Positive Approach to Resolving the Problems of
Separation and Divorce, 11 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 3029, 3029 (Sept. 24, 1985) [hereinafter
The Carrot Instead of the Stick].
53. Folberg, Divorce Mediation-A Workable Alternative, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS,
supra note 50, at 13.
54. See Gaughan, An Essay on the Ethics of Separation and Divorce Mediation, in AL-
TERNATIVE MEANS, supra note 50, at 321-37.
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B. The Role of the Attorney in the Mediation Setting
Individuals who use mediation generally seek to avoid the
trauma of a nasty adversarial divorce and to obtain a fair settle-
ment of post-marital obligations.5 5 Accordingly, the goal of the
family attorney in mediation should be to assist the client in
achieving the most amicable divorce possible. 56 The disengagement
process should be geared towards dissipating conflict and encour-
aging cooperation to determine the legal responsibilities each party
owes the other.
57
In mediation, the attorney generally assumes the role of coun-
selor." She is an instrument of peace trained to avoid litigation.5 9
As a result, the legal counselor influences and facilitates choice in
the law office and not in court."0 The attorney is also an advisor,
trained to advise, plan, conciliate and negotiate the social goals of
the individuals in the family unit.61 The attorney helps the client
55. See Bishop, Mediation Standards: An Ethical Safety Net, 4 MEDIATION Q. 5, 6
(1984); Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARiz. L.
REV. 329 (1984).
56. The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note 52, at 3029.
57. See J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 19-20.
Conflict is commonly viewed by the participants as a crisis. A crisis mentality lends
itself to destructive processes because people will often rush to use anything they
believe will relieve the conflict. Intervention techniques have been developed to help
create constructive outcomes from crisis, which may result from intrapersonal con-
flicts. By controlling the perception of what is at stake in a conflict, a mediator can
prevent destructive outcomes. This ability to defuse conflict, reframe the issues, and
realistically analyze outcomes is an important skill in mediation ....
Id.; see also Martin v. Martin, 157 Fla. 456, 26 So. 2d 183 (1946).
58. One commentator believes that the counselor role is an essential function, especially
when the mediation participants have children.
As [a] counselor I facilitate expression of feelings, concerns, and wishes. This pro-
motes freer, more effective communication between spouses and between parents and
children. I help parents to become aware of their attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and
communication patterns that interfere with satisfying family relationships and per-
sonal growth. I encourage parents to acknowledge their own responsibility for the way
things have been in the past, and help them focus on the present and future. I try to
reduce family conflict and tension and to prevent further psychosocial damage to the
children and family.
F. BIENENFELD, supra note 51, at 9-10. See generally GARDNER, supra note 26; The Carrot
Instead of the Stick, supra note 52, at 3029-30.
59. F. BIENENFELD, supra note 51, at 5-6; J. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION 4-5 (1981).
60. See sources cited supra note 58.
61. [Lawyers] are by training problem solvers, who have experience in seeking compro-
mise alternatives. They are skilled in exploring issues to isolate points of agreement
and disagreement. Lawyers can predict the consequences of various choices, and in-
form the clients of various legal norms so that they can make informed and intelli-
gent choices. By equalizing the information concerning the law, financial considera-
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make informed and rational choices among alternative courses of
conduct.6 2 The counselor advises about the legal, practical and so-
cial consequences of a given course of conduct.6 3 The chosen course
of conduct should be the most beneficial to the individual client as
well as other interested parties (e.g., grandparents and children)
and society. 4
In divorce mediation, lawyers must be able to work closely with
other professionals.6 5 Counselors, social workers, psychologists, and
clergy can assist the parties in dealing with emotional problems.6
By contrast, lawyers in the adversarial divorce process typically
use emotions to fight for their clients.67 However, only if the fear,
anger and resentment can be dissipated can the parties better
tions, tax issues, custody created parameters, lawyers can help balance the power
between clients. They could facilitate the client's assessment of choices which would
lead to a more informed settlement agreement.
Chang, supra note 48, at 114.
62. Id.; see also Folberg, supra note 53, at 38.
The attorney's task is to help the mediation participants arrive at informed decisions
concerning their post-marital relationships.
[T]he role of the professional is not to recommend certain decisions or to give advice.
Rather, the professional structures the discussions so that all necessary topics are
covered, gives information about the legal requirements and practical consequences of
each of the options available, and facilitates a thorough inquiry into the advantages
and disadvantages of each possible choice.
The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note 52, at 3030.
63. See Bishop, supra note 55, at 8.
64. See The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note 52, at 3030.
The people who will have to live with the outcome of these choices are the ones who
make the decisions. Thus, the professional in this context is more of a teacher than
an advisor: providing information, explaining the legal questions and requirements,
helping the couple to explore the impact of each possible solution on all members of
the family, and, finally, allowing the family to determine what is in its best interests.
Id.
65. This is considered to be an obligation of attorneys generally. The comment to Rule
2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct articulates the general duty as follows:
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of an-
other profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional compe-
tence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve
problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial special-
ists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a com-
petent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At
the same time a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of
action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 2.1 comment (1983).
66. See Brown, The Emotional Context of Divorce: Implications for Mediation, in AL-
TERNATIVE MEANS, supra note 50, at 43. "[T]he mediator is the person in a position to spot
problem areas and can refer the family members to other appropriate sources of help. He or
she can also draw on the expertise of other professionals for the clients' benefits." Id. at 48.
67. See sources cited supra note 42.
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come to terms with the drastic changes in their lifestyles.6 If the
emotional problems can be resolved in the counselor's office where
supportive help is. available, they can be kept out of the legal
proceedings."
A middle ground is thereby created between no legal representa-
tion, when the parties proceed pro se, and adversarial representa-
tion, when the parties hire attorneys to wage war. Using mediation,
the lawyer can facilitate a positive domestic reorganization which
both recognizes the need to protect the individual's family inter-
ests and promotes the fulfillment of family obligations.
7 0
C. Ethical Dilemmas in the Mediation Setting
The lawyer engaged in divorce mediation must resolve a number
of ethical dilemmas.7 1 For instance, how does a mediating lawyer
promote each participant's interests and yet facilitate the partici-
pants' family legal obligations? Most of these ethical dilemmas
stem from the adversarial ethics of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility.72 The organized bars, expressing uneasiness with
the lawyer who "represents" both partners in mediating a divorce
settlement, have articulated a variety of responses to the ethical
problems of mediation. 73 Responses by scholars such as Laurence
68. See Folberg, supra note 53, at 39.
69. See generally GARDNER, supra note 26; The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note
52.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 3-12.
71. The following materials explore the ethical dilemmas faced by the lawyer-mediator.
J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR supra note 51, at 251-89; Cornblatt, Legal Essay: Matrimonial
Mediation, 23 J. FAM. L. 99 (1984-85); Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM.
L.Q. 219 (1982); Hyde, Child Custody In Divorce, 35 Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 1984, at 57.
Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107
(1982).
72. These dilemmas include, among others, conflicts of interest, unauthorized practice of
law, full conflict disclosure with knowledgeable client consent, loyalty, confidentiality, solici-
tation, and the appearance of impropriety.
73. Several commentators have chronicled the development of state and local bar opin-
ions on the appropriateness of lawyers engaging in mediation. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note
71; Hyde, supra note 71; Silberman, supra note 71. The bar opinions depict a broad range of
ethical reflection. The thinking of bar ethics committees has been summarized as follows:
The message that emerges from the ethics opinion in jurisdictions that allow attor-
neys to serve as mediators or advise participants before a mediated agreement is fi-
nalized is that the participants must be made aware of the attorney's limited role and
the risks of mediation. The mediation participants must explicitly understand that a
mediating attorney cannot advance either party's interest over the interest of the
other and can give only nonpartisan legal advice to each party in the presence of the
other. It must be explained that the attorney's role is dependent upon full disclosure
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M. Hyde, Jr., Edward E. Crouch and Linda J. Silberman provide
an insightful background to the dilemmas of lawyering in the fam-
ily setting.
As Silberman points out, "[a] lawyer who wishes to undertake
divorce mediation as part of his legal practice faces the prohibition
of Canon 5, preventing representation of conflicting or potentially
differing interests. ' 74 The conflict can occur when the lawyer must
advocate a position favoring one marital partner when he ought to
oppose the very same position on behalf of the other partner. This
classic conflict of interest problem is exacerbated by the multiple
roles the lawyer-mediator can play. As mediator, the lawyer is the
neutral third party who moderates the process. 5 The lawyer is also
a legal advisor who identifies the legal issues, articulates legal rules
and judicial precedent and offers professional legal judgment.76 He
can also be a draftsman, capturing the parties' agreement in legal
language that the court will enforce. 7 Finally, the lawyer can serve
as a litigation representative, presenting the uncontested divorce
petition in court on behalf of one partner when the other partner
agrees to forego legal representation. 8
With this myriad of potential roles, one questions whom or what
the lawyer represents in the mediation process.7 9 Certainly repre-
of all relevant facts by the participants and that in a divorce case without full disclo-
sure the settlement may be set aside by the court upon the insistance of either party.
The participants must be urged to obtain independent review of the agreement and
must be aware from the outset that the attorney may not represent any or all of them
in any proceeding relating to the conflict or in any subsequent capacity.
J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 252-53.
74. Silberman, supra note 71, at 109.
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1983).
76. See id. Rule 2.1.
77. The lawyer, as a neutral mediator, must explain to both parties the legal ramifica-
tions of the agreement he has drafted and must "[serve] as an amanuensis, or notary in the
European sense, who is educated enough to 'put into legal language' the parties' common
intentions once their thoughts have been straightened out and agreement reached in mutual
discussion." Crouch, supra note 71, at 229-30.
78. In order for the lawyer to serve in the capacity of litigation representative, both part-
ners must give informed consent after successful mediation of an agreement. If mediation
fails, the lawyer cannot represent either party in subsequent, "real," adversarial litigation.
See Crouch, supra note 71, at 230-31.
79. The concept of representation is difficult to define because its meaning fluctuates
with the changing nature of the attorney-client relationship.
Dual representation comtemplates, in its most innocent form, representation by one
lawyer to the court of the one desire that warring parties can unite in: their desire for
a divorce that incorporates the written agreement they have reached. Mediation, as
in labor-management conflicts, contemplates each side's presenting its arguments to
the other in the presence of a neutral third party who aims at a resolution of the
issues that will represent the least detriment to each party.
Id. at 224.
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sentation could include all of the tasks previously mentioned. 0
The lawyer-mediator could represent the divorce situation either
between the parties or in court as contemplated by Rule 2.2 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.81 Similarly, she could re-
present "the family" as "it" attempts to resolve the divorce dis-
pute. Crouch, however, finds the family "an abstraction incapable
of being a client. '8 2 Moreover, the interests of the individual fam-
ily members, including the children, usually diverge.8 3 The lawyer
could represent the interests of both partners or of just one part-
ner, provided that the other partner agrees to be unrepresented.
Some bar ethics committees, however, have declared that the law-
yer mediator represents neither party, with each disavowing legal
representation. 4
One way to eliminate the conflict of interest problem is to have
each partner consult independent counsel, especially before a final
agreement is signed. 5 This approach involves two or three lawyers
80. See Silberman, supra note 71, at 122.
81. RULE 2.2 Intermediary
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common
representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the
attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the common
representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms com-
patible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make ade-
quately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interest of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is un-
successful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be under-
taken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer
has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning
the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that
each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so request, or if any
of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the
lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the
subject of the intermediation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1983).
82. Crouch, supra note 71, at 227.
83. Id. at 227, 229.
84. See Silberman, supra note 71, at 109-23 (discussion of ethics opinions issued in Bos-
ton, New York, and Portland, Or.); see also Crouch, supra note 71, at 225-27; Hyde, supra
note 71, at 65-66.
85. See Crouch, supra note 71, at 234.
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in the process, resulting in higher costs and the increased possibil-
ity of the mediated dispute turning into an adversarial conflict.
This result may be unavoidable, however, because there may be
simply too many hidden and unresolvable conflicts for one lawyer
to comply with the applicable professional ethics requirements.8 6
If the mediator is a non-lawyer, concerns about the unauthorized
practice of law arise.8 7 The non-lawyer usually is a social worker or
mental health professional."' The best results could be achieved by
using a team approach combining a mental health professional (an
individual skilled in personal counselling) and a lawyer.89 However,
this approach could involve the attorney in aiding the unautho-
rized practice of law, which includes improperly practicing law
with a non-lawyer, splitting fees with a non-lawyer, and working
for clients of a lay employer at a mediation center.8 0
The mediation center, clinic or association which promotes di-
vorce mediation creates unique ethical problems for the lawyer. 9'
In the structured mediation model designed by O.J. Coogler, the
mediation center selects an attorney from a panel of qualified law-
yers to answer all legal questions and to formalize the agreement. 92
86. Id. at 235-37; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-105 (1981)
(an attorney may not accept or continue employment if the interests of another client may
impair his independent professional judgment); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 2.2 (1983) (an attorney may act as an intermediary between clients under certain con-
ditions); Silberman, supra note 71, at 226. Crouch succinctly states the dilemma the lawyer-
mediator faces as follows:
Does the representation that is disavowed (or shared, depending on how you look at
it) include advice that benefits one party to the detriment of the other? Presumably
so. The question that naturally arises is what happens when the attorney-mediator
sees one party being "disadvantaged" in negotiations. If the mediatory cannot advise
one party to break off mediation without hurting the interests of the one who is gain-
ing by mediation, then a real conflict of interests problem seems to arise. Obviously
the definitions of benefit and detriment in this context are infinitely debatable and
presumably framed by the preliminary assumption that a fair, compromised and con-
flict-avoiding settlement is the desire of both.
Crouch, supra note 71, at 226.
87. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 3, DR 3-101 (1981).
88. See Silberman, supra note 71, at 123-29.
89. This is viewed as a preferred method of mediation because the legal complexities and
the emotional turmoil of marital dissolution can be managed as interrelated problems. See
Hyde, supra note 71, at 67-68; Silberman, supra note 71, at 129-34; see also Cornblatt,
supra note 71, at 105-06.
90. See J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 255-57; Silberman, supra note 71, at
131.
91. See Silberman, supra note 71, at 134-45.
92. 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT (1978).
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There are obvious problems concerning the unauthorized prac-
tice of law in the Coogler mediation center model. The conflict of
interest problems are even more difficult to solve. Does the center's
interest in promoting successful mediation conflict with the client's
interests, which may be better served by resort to adversarial liti-
gation? Who has control of the mediation process and therefore
directly or indirectly influences the lawyer's professional legal
judgment? Since the attorney-advisor is chosen by the mediation
center, do the parties have an opportunity to give knowing consent
to this unique form of attorney-client relationship? Is the lawyer's
participation in the mediation center an impermissible solicitation
of legal business, since the lawyers render legal judgments and
then share in the fees charged for that service?93 Additionally, is
providing mediation services through a center or a mediation asso-
ciation different from providing legal services as a form of political
or associational expression as permitted by The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility? ""
There is still the ultimate problem of sufficiently protecting each
partner's rights, even if they avail themselves of independent coun-
sel. The discussion becomes sterile if we say that full disclosure
and consent of both parties is sufficient to resolve the ethical di-
lemma.9 5 Crouch questions whether any client would ever have
enough sophistication to know what rights and alternatives really
have been given up in consenting to any of the mediation
processes.96 Intelligent consent is made even more difficult by
problems inherent in the mediation process, such as overreaching
by the mediator, imbalance of negotiating power between the par-
ties, and reluctance to abandon a failing mediation because of the
heavy investments of time and money."
Certain confidentiality and jurisdictional problems in the media-
tion process must also be addressed. Confidentiality in the media-
tion process is essential to preserve the open nature of the pro-
93. Silberman, supra note 71, at 140-41.
94. Id.; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D) (1981). Folberg
and Taylor also recognize these problems but suggest that they "can generally be avoided
with careful structuring of the practice and sensitivity to the legitimate concerns of the bar
." J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 255.
95. See Crouch, The Dark Side of Mediation: Still Unexplored, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS,
supra note 50, at 349-50.
96. See Crouch, supra note 71, at 237-39.
97. For a discussion of the inherent problems of divorce mediation, see Crouch, supra
note 71, at 240-45; Hyde, supra note 71, at 63; Silberman, supra note 71, at 111-14.
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cess.98 Furthermore, as mediation practice evolves, individual
jurisdictions will be pressed to regulate the mediators. Licensing,
certification, competency evaluations, continuing education re-
quirements, and disciplinary procedures must be developed to pro-
tect the consumer of mediation services.9 9 A full discussion of these
issues is beyond the scope of this article but the issues nevertheless
deserve to be highlighted here.
V. THE NEW MEDIATION STANDARDS
A. The Collective Search for Uniform Standards
Dozens of professional mediation organizations and individuals
involved in the mediation process have come together to draft
standards of conduct for mediators, both lawyers and non-law-
yers.100 In May, 1984, the Association of Family and Conciliation
Courts (AFCC) composed the Model Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation.0 1 In addition, the American Bar
Association (ABA) has approved the Standards of Practice for
Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes.102
In general, mediation standards can be adopted by agencies with
regulatory authority over mediation. Mediation standards may also
"become accepted as normative behavior for mediators by judicial
or administrative bodies called upon to evaluate claims or requests
concerning specific mediatory behaviors." 0 3 The standards are sig-
nificant because they promote dialogue on acceptable mediator
conduct, and they educate the public on the mediation process. 04
Thomas Bishop compares mediation standards to canons of ethics
98. For an analysis of mediation confidentiality issues, including mediation evidentiary
privilege of nondisclosure, confidentiality contracted by the parties, judicially mandated me-
diator testimony, and the work-product doctrine, see J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note
51, at 263-80.
99. See generally, J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 260-63; Carnevale & Sin-
icropi, Professionalization: Selected Ethical Issues in Dispute Resolution, 9 JUST. Sys. J.
228, 236 (1984); Hyde, supra note 71, at 68.
100. For a discussion of the drafting process and a listing of organizations and individu-
als participating in the process, see AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Introduction; Bishop,
supra note 55, at 6; Loeb, Introduction to the Standards of Practice for Family Mediators,
17 FAm. L.Q. 5 (1984).
101. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1.
102. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1.
103. Bishop, supra note 1, at 4; see also Bishop, supra note 55 at _; Bishop, The Stan-
dards of Practice for Family Mediators: An Individual Interpretation & Comments, 17
FAM. L.Q. 461 (1984).
104. Bishop, supra note 1; see also AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1.
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because they are not rules of conduct in the formal sense. He
states that:
As such, they are statements of axiomatic norms expressing in gen-
eral terms the standards of professional conduct expected of
mediators in their relationship to the public, to mediation partici-
pants, and to other professionals, such as mediators, lawyers, and
mental health care givers, who may have involvement with mediat-
ing parties." 5
The following discussion describes the general concepts upon
which the mediation standards are based. A more detailed discus-
sion of particular standards will be presented in Section VI.
Each set of standards begins with a preamble and an introduc-
tion presenting the concept of mediation,106 the goals of the media-
tion process 107 and the role of each participant.' First, it is in-
cumbent upon the mediator to explain the nature of mediation,
and describe how mediation differs from other family dispute reso-
lution mechanisms. 09 Mediation ground rules are established for,
among other purposes, use of outside experts," 0 confidentiality, 11
105. Bishop, supra note 1, at 4. The Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators,
promulgated by the Center for Dispute Resolution, emphasizes the value of these standards
to practicing mediators who seek guidelines for their behavior. It states:
This code is not designed to override or supersede any laws or government regula-
tions which prescribe responsibilities of mediators and others in the helping profes-
sions. It is a personal code relating to the conduct of the individual mediator and is
intended to establish principles applicable to all professional mediators employed by
private, city, state, or federal agencies.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Preamble (Center for Dispute Resolution
1982), reprinted in J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 349.
106. "Mediation is a family centered conflict resolution process in which an impartial
third party assists the participants to negotiate a consensual and informed settlement."
AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble.
"For the purposes of these standards, family mediation is defined as a process in which
lawyer helps family members resolve their disputes in an informative and consensual man-
ner." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble. See generally Bishop, supra note 55.
107. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Preamble.
108. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Preamble.
109. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble, Standard I(A); ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 1, Standard I(A)(1).
110. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VII(A) (discussing the need to ob-
tain outside expert information and advice when necessary to reach agreement), Standard
VII(C) (discussing the need for independent legal counsel); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard VI (noting the mediator's duty to advise mediation participants to seek indepen-
dent legal review of all agreements).
111. "The mediator shall not voluntarily disclose any information obtained through the
mediation process without the prior consent of both participants." ABA STANDARDS, supra
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individual caucuses," 2 and disclosure of information necessary for
the complete development of all issues.1" 3 Second, it is necessary to
establish an understanding of the expectations and roles of all the
participants." 4 The mediator should disclose her individual bi-
ases, 1 5 expose potential conflicts of interest,"" disclose her train-
ing and experience," 7 and describe in detail her role as the impar-
tial third party."8 At this juncture, the mediator must make an
assessment of the participants' ability (emotional and intellectual)
to engage fruitfully in the divorce mediation process."' This is a
note 1, Standard II; see also AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV. Both sets of
standards require the mediator to inform the participants that a mediator may be required
by law to disclose information. See infra text accompanying notes 133-38.
112. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV(C); ABA S76NDARDS, supra note
1, Standard I(A)(7). Generally, both parties must consent to individual caucuses with the
mediator.
113. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(B); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard I(A)(2). "The mediator shall assure that there is full financial disclosure, evalua-
tion, and development of relevant factual information in the mediation process, such as each
would reasonably receive in the normal discovery process." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard IV(A).
114. Understanding how the "mediation game" is played and what role each player has
is crucial to an individual's ability to participate in the process.
Bishop advises:
[T]he mediator should define himself or herself as part of this process. The orienta-
tion is also a time of assessment. The mediator has a responsibility to determine
whether a couple is suited for the process, or whether another form of conflict resolu-
tion is more appropriate. This is also an opportunity for the mediator to make a self-
assessment. Just as there are patients who are a poor match for the counselor or
therapist or potential poor matches between clients and lawyers, there may be
couples or individuals with interests, personalities, or disputes inappropriate for the
mediator. All this should be explored and discussed before any agreement is made.
Bishop, supra note 55, at 8.
115. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(D)(1); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard III(B).
116. See, e.g., AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II(B)(1) (prior relationships),
Standard II(B)(2) (relationship to participants), Standard II(B)(3) (conflicts of interest). In
particular, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard III(A), states that "The mediator shall
not represent either party during or after the mediation process in any legal matters. In the
event the mediator has represented one of the participants beforehand, the mediator shall
not undertake the mediation;" see also id. Standard I(A)(6) ("The mediator shall inform the
participants of the need to employ independent legal counsel for advice throughout the me-
diation process . . ").
117. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(D)(2). There is no equivalent position
in the ABA Standards.
118. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II(A); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard I(D). For a more detailed analysis of the concept of impartiality, see infra text
accompanying notes 201-08.
119. The mediator shall assure that each participant has had an opportunity to under-
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duty which continues throughout the process.12 0 If there is doubt,
the parties should be advised to seek other methods of dispute res-
olution. 12 The participants must understand that they enter into
mediation in order to reach their own informed resolution of the
issues. 22 This will require trust and honesty, and will involve risks
not assumed in the adversarial process. 23 Finally, recognizing the
benefits to be gained by mediation, "[t]he mediator and the par-
ticipants shall agree upon the duties and responsibilities that each
is accepting in the mediation process. This may be by a written or
verbal agreement."' 24
There are general provisions which should aid the public in
gauging commonly accepted mediation practices. 125 The costs and
fees for mediation and the responsibility for payment should be
stand the implications and ramifications of available options .... The mediator
shall explore whether the participants are capable of participating in informed nego-
tiations. The mediator may postpone mediation and refer the parties to appropriate
resources if necessary.
AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VIII.
The mediator shall assess the ability and willingness of the participants to mediate.
The mediator has a continuing duty to assess his or her own ability and willingness to
undertake mediation with the particular participants and the issues to be mediated.
The mediator shall not continue and shall terminate the process, if in his or her judg-
ment, one of the parties is not able or willing to participate in good faith.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(A)(4).
120. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(A)(4).
121. Id.
122. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VI(A) provides that "[t]he primary
responsbility for the resolution of a dispute rests with the participants .... This require-
ment is implicit in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV, which states that "[tihe
mediator has a duty to assure that the mediation participants make decisions based upon
sufficient information and knowledge." Bishop's explanation of the ABA Standards empha-
sizes the notion of self-determination:
Mediation is defined and promoted as a process of decision-making in which the par-
ticipants negotiate with the assistance of a qualified and impartial mediator. Their
participation is consensual; they make decisions based on complete information that
each fully understands. Also, mediation is intended to be a private process in which
the participants have the authority as well as the responsibility to make decisions
that they intend to be durable.
Bishop, supra note 55, at 9.
123. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VIII. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard II(C) provides that "[a]t [the] orientation session, the mediator must discuss with
the participants the potential outcome of their disclosure of facts to each other during the
mediation process."
124. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(F).
125. Bishop, supra note 55, at 7.
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discussed early in the process.12  A reasonable fee 127 should be set
in advance, because "[i]t is inappropriate for a mediator to charge
a contingency fee or to base the fee on the outcome of the media-
tion process."'12  Advertisement of mediation services must not be
false or misleading. 29 Mediators should form cooperative relation-
ships with other professionals whose services the participants may
need.i30 Mediators should also work to promote the development
of mediation.13' To further protect the public, mediators should ac-
quire advanced training and participate in continuing education.
132
The issue of confidentiality is always addressed with a recogni-
tion that each jurisdiction will have rules of privilege governing the
non-disclosure of confidential information. In recognizing that the
integrity of this private process should be protected, three disclo-
sure situations are emphasized. 33 First, the participants must vol-
untarily and individually disclose to each other personal informa-
tion normally protected by the attorney-client privilege. 34 "The
mediator shall discuss with the participants the potential conse-
quences of their disclosure of facts to each other during the media-
tion process."'3 5 Second, the mediator should not disclose informa-
tion to third parties without the consent of the participants. 13 6
Third, a mediator's testimony may be compelled by the court.3 7
The individual participant may also compel mediator testimony,
prior agreements to the contrary notwithstanding.'
126. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard III; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard I(A)(5).
127. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard III(B); defines a reasonable fee as fol-
lows: "When setting fees, the mediator shall ensure that they are explicit, fair, reasonable
and commensurate with the service to be performed. Unearned fees should be promptly
returned to the clients."
128. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(A)(5); see also AFCC STANDARDS, supra
note 1, Standard III(C).
129. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard XI.
130. See id. Standard XII.
131. See id. Standard XIII.
132. See id. Standard X.
133. See supra note 98.
134. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(B); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard I(A)(2); see also J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 264.
135. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV(A)(3); see also ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 1, Standard II(C).
136. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV(B)(1); ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 1, Standard II(A).
137. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV(A)(2); ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 1, Standards II(B), III(F).
138. Most private mediators require their clients to sign an agreement expressly providing
that the mediation sessions will be confidential and that the mediator will not be
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The principle of self-determination .by the participants is funda-
mental to the process. "The primary responsibility for the resolu-
tion of a dispute rests with the participants. The mediator's obliga-
tion is to assist the disputants in reaching an informed and
voluntary settlement. At no time, shall a mediator coerce a partici-
pant into agreement or make a substantive decision for any
participant.' 13 9
The principles of impartiality140 and neutrality' 4 ' can be distin-
guished by focusing on the mediator's conduct and his relationship
with the participants. An impartial mediator directs the process
but does not advocate a particular solution or favor one participant
over another. 42 A neutral mediator will consider his personal back-
ground and prior relationships with a participant.143 Here the focus
is on eliminating actual or perceived conflicts of interest.'4
The standards include rules to encourage the use of outside ex-
perts to provide legal, financial or psychological information and
advice. 45 Finally, the standards suggest conduct for concluding the
mediation process. 4' The available options depend on the media-
tor's assessment of the fairness and reasonableness of the partici-
pants' agreement.
47
called to testify about what is said or to give any professional opinion related to the
case in court. A court would not necessarily be bound to honor this private contract,
though it may be persuaded by public policy considerations to do so.
J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 271.
139. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VI(A). The ABA Standards do not have
a similar explicit standard, but do imply the doctrine of self-determination in the Preamble,
stating that it is important that participants "reach decisions voluntarily; that their deci-
sions be based on sufficient factual data; and that each participant understands the informa-
tion upon which decisions are reached." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble. In addi-
tion, the ABA Standards forbid lawyer-mediators to represent either party individually in
any legal matters during or following the mediation. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Stan-
dard III(A). Furthermore, "[t]he mediator has a continuing duty to advise each of the medi-
ation participants to obtain legal review prior to reaching any agreement." ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 1, Standard VI.
140. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II(A); ABA STANDARDS, supra note
1, Standard III.
141. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II(B).
142. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II(A).
143. Id. Standard II(B).
144. See id. Standard I(D)(1).
145. See id. Standard VII; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VI.
146. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IX; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard V.
147. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IX(B)(2); ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 1, Standard V(B).
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B. Standards as Promulgated by the State of Florida-An Illus-
trative Response
This section will consider how states are currently wrestling with
the problem of defining appropriate ethical standards for lawyers
engaged in divorce mediation.14 The primary focus will be on the
State of Florida, which is illustrative of what other states have
done in this area. Some state bars have issued ethical opinions that
permit divorce mediation in varying degrees and articulate ethical
guidelines.149 Other states have set ethical standards for lawyer-
mediators through judicial opinions in cases reviewing the appro-
priateness of attorneys' mediation of family dissolutions.
150
1. General Parameters
Given the emerging body of professional opinions, judicial case
law, and literature, Florida's response to divorce mediation illus-
trates a trend in mediation ethical standards. As of January 1,
1987, the new Rules and Regulations of the Florida Bar, a modi-
fied version of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, will
be in effect.15 . Of specific interest is Rule 4-2.2, which sets ethical
standards for the lawyer who acts as an intermediary. 152 Also, the
Florida Bar has adopted Formal Advisory Opinion 86-8 which sets
out specific guidelines for lawyers engaged in divorce mediation.
5 3
Any lawyer seeking to engage in mediation between clients is
guided by the mandates of Rule 4-2.2 of the Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar.'5 Rule 4-2.2 imposes three conditions with which the
148. See generally supra note 48.
149. Ethical opinions are responses to written inquiries by lawyers about ethical con-
duct. The opinions may be promulgated by ethics committees at both the state and national
levels. While these opinions are merely advisory in nature, it is quite unlikely that a lawyer
would be disciplined for relying on an ethical opinion. Id. at 111 n.4.
150. See, e.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966);
Blum v. Blum, 59 Md. App. 584, 477 A.2d 289 (1984); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 691 S.W.2d 312
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 436 N.E.2d 476, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26
(1982); Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 365 N.E.2d 849, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1977); Bar-
bour v. Barbour, 146 Vt. 506, 505 A.2d 1217 (1986).
151. On July 7, 1986, the Florida Supreme Court passed the Rules Regulating the Flor-
ida Bar, to become effective on January 1, 1987, and supercede all other rules of professional
conduct in effect in Florida. See Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1986)
(per curiam); RULEs REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR (West Supp. 1987).
152. RULEs REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-2.2 (West Supp. 1987).
153. See Florida Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Advisory Op. 86-8 (1986); see also
Fla. B. News, Oct. 15, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
154. RULEs REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-2.2 (West Supp. 1987) (governing cir-
cumstances under which an attorney may act as an intermediary).
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attorney must comply. The attorney must first engage in active,
educational consultation with the parties.155 The clients must also
consent to this method of professional service after being informed
of the nature of the service and the risks involved. 5" Second, the
attorney must assess the clients' capacity to participate in media-
tion. 57 In addition, the attorney must determine whether the par-
ticular subject matter is one in which mediation is appropriate and
whether each party will be able to protect his respective inter-
ests. ' 8 Third, the attorney must conduct a self-assessment to in-
sure that he will remain impartial and still fulfill other ethical du-
ties. 159 To be impartial, the attorney must not favor one party over
155. Rule 4-2.2 provides that
(a) A lawyer may act as an intermediary between clients if:
(1) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common
representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the
attorney-client privileges and obtains each client's consent to the common
representation.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning
the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that
each client can make adequately informed decisions ....
Id. Rule 4-2.2(a)(1), (b).
156. Id. The comment to Rule 4-2.2 requires that "[iln acting as intermediary between
clients, the lawyer is required to consult with the clients on implications of doing so and to
proceed only upon consent based on such a consultation." Id. Rule 4-2.2 comment.
157. The Florida Rules also require that:
[(a)](2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms
compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make ade-
quately informed decisions in the matter, and that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuc-
cessful ....
Id. Rule 4-2.2(a)(2).
158. Id. The comment following Rule 4-2.2 states:
The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. Forms of intermedi-
ation range from informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented by the
respective client and the lawyer decides the outcome, to mediation, to common repre-
sentation where the clients' interests are substantially though not entirely compati-
ble. One form may be appropriate in circumstances where another would not. Other
relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a
continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between
the parties or terminating one.
Id. Rule 4-2.2 comment.
159. Rule 4-2.2 requires that "[t]he lawyer reasonably believes that the common repre-
sentation can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibili-
ties the lawyer has to any of the clients." Id. Rule 4-2.2(a)(3).
The comments after Rule 4-2.2 suggest that other responsibilities might include client-
lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. Specifically, the comments state:
In a common representation, the lawyer is still required both to keep each client ade-
quately informed and to maintain confidentiality of information relating to the repre-
352
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the other.16 0 These three conditions must be maintained through-
out the mediation process or the attorney must withdraw and may
not subsequently represent any of the clients in that matter.'
2. Specific Guidelines
The guidance of Rule 4-2.2 of the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar, however, is not sufficient for the attorney seeking to engage in
divorce mediation. The Rule is designed for situations where the
lawyer continues to represent more than one client, focusing on a
traditional representational relationship. 6 2 In Florida, the lawyer
historically has been prohibited from representing both parties in a
divorce.16 3 Proposed Advisory Opinion 86-8, adopted in 1986, was
promulgated to remedy the situation and provide guidance for law-
yers providing divorce mediation services.
0 4
The guidelines in Proposed Advisory Opinion 86-8 can best be
discussed by considering the following four broad concerns: the
mediation process, the mediation participants, the mediator and
outside counsel. 65
sentation.... Complying With both requirements while acting as intermediary re-
quires a delicate balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the common
representation is improper. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevail-
ing rule is that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not at-
tach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the
privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so
advised.
Id. Rule 4-2.2 comment.
160. See id. Rule 4-2.2 comment.
161. Id. Rule 4-2.2(c).
162. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-2.2 comment (West Supp. 1987).
163. See Florida Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Advisory Op. 71-45 (1971), re-
printed in 1 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE FLORIDA BAR 418-24 (1982).
164. See Florida Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Proposed Advisory Op. 86-8 (1986),
reprinted in 1 Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (University Publi-
cations of America) Florida Opinions 5-7 (1987) [hereinafter Advisory Op. 86-8]. The as-
sumption behind the opinion is that the lawyer does not serve in a representative capacity
and that the mediation participants must seek traditional legal advice, protection, and guid-
ance from independent counsel. Proposed Advisory Opinion 86-8 was a response to an in-
quiry by an attorney with a master's degree in counseling psychology who proposed to offer
divorce mediation services.
165. These are broad categories that express the general concerns of the bar. Some of
the eight guidelines could be classified in multiple categories, but are presented under the
one to which they are most nearly related. Many of the concerns expressed in Proposed
Advisory Opinion 86-8 are also implicit in Rule 4-2.2 of the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar.
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a. The Mediation Process
The first task of the mediator is to. "conduct an orientation ses-
sion to explain the mediation process, to agree with the parties on
scope and procedures, and to assess the appropriateness of media-
tion for the parties."1"6 It is at this time that the lawyer should
state the risks involved in proceeding with divorce mediation. 67
Included in this statement should be a declaration that: (1) the
mediator represents neither participant, 161 (2) that the attorney-
client privilege may not apply,' 9 and (3) that the participants
should consult independent counsel. 70 Because the lawyer repre-
sents neither party, he "shall not communicate with one mediation
party alone except with the prior consent of the other party.' 7' In
addition, the mediator should discuss the payment of fees with




The guidelines are not explicitly addressed to the participants,
but they do imply that the participants have responsibilities. The
participants must be willing and able to engage in the mediation
process in good faith. 73 The lawyer "should suspend or terminate
the mediation if it becomes apparent that one of the parties is not
participating in good faith.' 1 74 However, the critical question left
unanswered in Proposed Advisory Opinion 86-8 is how one mea-
sures good faith.
166. Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note 164.
167. Id.
168. "He must explain the limitations of his role as mediator, specifically that he does
not represent either of the parties and will not be able to represent either of them in ob-
taining the dissolution of marriage or in any matter related to the mediation." Id.
169. "The mediator should explain that because he is not representing the parties, the
attorney-client privilege may not apply to communications between the parties and him-
self." Id.
170. "He should explain the risks of proceeding without independent counsel and advise
the parties to consult independent counsel during the course of the mediation and before
signing any settlement agreement that he might prepare for them." Id.
171. Id.
172. "The lawyer shall explain the fees for mediation. It is inappropriate for a mediator
to charge a contingency fee or to base the fee on the outcome of the mediation process." Id.
173. "The lawyer must not agree to undertake mediation . . . if the conduct of either
party suggests that the party is unwilling or unable to participate in good faith." Advisory




Presumably, the nature of mediation requires good faith in sev-
eral areas. For instance, cooperation between the parties is a neces-
sary prerequisite. Therefore, one requirement of good faith is that
each participant must bring all of the information necessary to re-
solve the pertinent issues.17 5 The lawyer has the duty to "attempt
to ensure that the parties have an equal understanding of the in-
formation."'71 6 Accordingly, all information should be disclosed to
the mediator in the presence of the other party.
1
c. The Mediator
The duties of the mediator parallel the duties mandated by Rule
4-2.2178 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. First, the media-
tor educates the participants on the nature and risks of the media-
tion process during the initial orientation session. 79 During the
mediation process, the mediator should be certain that the partici-
pants have adequate information, including financial informa-
tion.180 Further, "[t]he lawyer may define legal issues and advise
the parties on the legal consequences of various courses of
action.' 81
Second, the lawyer must "assess the appropriateness of media-
tion for the parties."'8 2 Since the lawyer represents neither party,
each party must be able to make the ultimate decisions with possi-
ble assistance from independent counsel. 83 The lawyer's evalua-
tion of the parties' capacity must satisfy him "that the parties un-
derstand the nature and risks of mediation and the significance of
the fact that he represents neither party.' ' 8 4 The threshold for this
determination is whether "the parties [can] reach a prudent reso-
lution without the advice of separate and independent legal
counsel.'
8 5
175. "The lawyer has a duty to assure that the participants make decisions based upon
adequate information, including financial information." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-2.2 (West Supp. 1987); see also supra
notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
180. Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note 164.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. "If the parties so desire, the lawyer may prepare a settlement agreement for the
parties that reflects the decisions made by them during the mediation. The lawyer should
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Third, the mediator must continually remain impartial.186 Ar-
guably, because he represents neither of the parties, he cannot pro-
mote one over the other.18 7 Additionally, his impartiality is com-
promised if he has or has had a professional relationship with
either party in another context before or during the present media-
tion."8 If he cannot be impartial, he must terminate the media-
tion.' These three conditions must exist throughout the media-
tion process; if one is not present, mediation must be
terminated. 190
d. The Outside Counsel
None of the guidelines specifically address the ethical obligation
of outside counsel. The parties are to be advised to consult inde-
pendent counsel.' 9' The mediator may "not refer either of the par-
ticipants to any particular attorney."' 92 However, the mediator can
refer the participants to a "bar association list" or "provide a list
of qualified family law attorneys in the community.' ' 9 3 Presuma-
bly, independent counsel would be guided by the ethical standards
of Rule 4-2.1 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.'
C. Mediation Ethics Shortfall
Mediation standards advance the cause of family dispute resolu-
tion through mediation. With the proliferation of mediation cen-
ters and individuals claiming to be mediators, these standards and
the debate they should inspire will ensure the development of com-
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. "Thus the lawyer should not undertake mediation if he previously provided legal
representation to either of the parties and he must not represent either of the parties in any
legal matter during mediation." Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note 164.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors that may be rele-




petent, ethical mediation. Society will benefit because citizens can
make more intelligent decisions about the appropriateness of the
mediation option.195
However, the standards leave some questions unanswered and
also raise new concerns. They recognize potential ethical dilemmas,
but offer limited assistance to the mediator confronted with these
dilemmas. How should the mediator react to unequal bargaining
power between the participants when they insist upon self-deter-
mination of their marital dissolution? Should outside counseling be
recommended or does this breach the principle of impartiality?
How does the mediator successfully walk the tightrope of imparti-
ality and neutrality? When should he counsel a participant to be
less irrational in his or her demands? What advice may be ren-
dered and what resolutions may be suggested without invading the
couple's right of self-determination? If the mediator is to refer the
participants to outside experts, what role do these experts play?
What principles direct the behavior of the outside experts? On
what basis can it be determined whether a settlement is fair? How
can it be determined whether the participants' conduct or their
agreement is unreasonable? If termination of the mediation pro-
cess becomes a necessity, on what basis should the mediator
respond?
When confronted with these dilemmas which have no ready so-
lution, the mediator should have more guidance in choosing appro-
priate and ethical responses. Fortunately, there are ethical impera-
tives in the family law setting which may help. The next section of
this article will explore the ethical texture of the family mediation
process and suggest a philosophical framework for guiding the di-
vorce mediator.
195. Bishop argues that the popularization of mediation may give the public a false im-
pression of the potentials of mediation in family dissolutions. He suggests:
The publication and dissemination of standards would counter this misapprehension
by educating the public to how mediation can serve their needs. If potential media-
tion participants have a better understanding of the purpose of the process and its
characteristics before committing themselves to participate, they are likely to benefit
from it .... The standards are written to convey the idea that mediation is not a
manipulative process in which the most persuasive or powerful prevails. In sum, read
by potential mediation consumers, the standards are a label for the practice. They
permit would-be participants to make a preliminary assessment of whether the pro-
cess is suitable for them.
Bishop, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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VI. FACILITATIVE ETHICS IN THE FAMILY LAW SETTING
A. The Mediation Process as an Ethical Source
The principle task of the divorce process and the divorce lawyer
should be to facilitate the establishment of financial, social and
emotional security for the parties to the greatest extent practica-
ble.'96 If the law is designed to facilitate the discharge of family
legal obligations, the lawyer should also facilitate these duties.
197
One of the most noble functions of law is to serve as a model of
what is expected. Adjudicatory procedures, instead of providing
models, are too often used coercively to supplant self-determination
with no evidence that the disputants have been encouraged and
helped to resolve their differences. The law should be premised on
the expectation that people will not abdicate to a lawyer or a judge
the responsibility of deciding what is fair. Using mediation to facili-
tate conflict resolution and encourage self-determination thus
strengthens democratic values and enhances the dignity of those in
conflict.198
As suggested in the literature describing the adversarial process,
the present state codes of professional conduct do not readily allow
attorneys to employ a facilitative approach to the practice of medi-
ation.'99 This portion of the article will consider how an attorney
can ethically practice mediation in a family law setting. It will pro-
pose a style of ethics called "facilitative ethics."200
196. See supra text accompanying notes 55-70.
197. One commentator suggests that one proper framework for analyzing ethical issues is
to consider the rights and duties of the client, especially in relationship to others (e.g., for-
mer spouses and children). L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHIcs: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY, § 8.01 (1982). Patterson says, "[s]ince the law of legal ethics is derivative in nature,
being derived from the positive law defining the rights and duties of the client, the lawyer's
rights and duties . . .are derivative in nature .... He can properly exercise only such
rights and fulfill only such duties as the client has." Id. at 8-1 to -2. One way of viewing this
framework in the mediation setting is to urge that the lawyer has a duty to aid the media-
tion participants in arriving at solutions fulfilling their post-dissolution obligations.
198. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 35.
199. See sources cited supra note 71.
200. Many commentators use the term "facilitate" when describing the fundamental na-
ture of divorce mediation. "[m]ediators can facilitate private ordering, or negotiated out-
comes, between disputants by helping them get information on applicable legal norms and
principles, as well as the probable outcome in court if the case is litigated." J. FOLBERG & A.
TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 36. "As counselor I facilitate expression of feelings, concerns, and
wishes. This promotes freer, more effective communication between spouses and between
parents and children." F. BIENENFELD, supra note 51, at 9; see also Chang, supra note 48, at
111, The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note 52.
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B. Riskin's Neutral Lawyer
Professor Leonard L. Riskin, in a recent article, attempts to
push beyond the constraints of adversarial ethics and develop
standards of fairness and maximization that better reflect the con-
cept of the mediation process.2"' Riskin urges that the analysis be
extended further to capture what should be the spirit of the family
mediation process-the legal and moral obligations inherent in the
family and in family law. 202
According to Professor Riskin, a neutral lawyer is one who can
participate in the family mediation process and allow both voices
to be expressed.203 In the mediation process a neutral lawyer can
offer a variety of legal services depending upon the needs and
desires of the parties involved. As Riskin explains:
The legal services supplied by neutral lawyers in mediation fall
along a continuum. At one extreme is the so-called "impartial advi-
sory attorney" who meets with the parties jointly to answer legal
questions or to incorporate the decisions they have reached into a
written contract. Such lawyers normally do not function as
mediators, i.e., they do not try explicitly to help the parties reach an
agreement. In an intermediate position on the continuum is the law-
yer who performs the same kind of service as an impartial advisory
attorney, but does so as part of a team with a mediator, ordinarily a
psychotherapist. Finally, some lawyers serve explicitly as
mediators.2
04
The neutral lawyer gives legal protection to parties by informing
them of their legal rights and options in a non-adversarial pos-
ture.0 5 Moreover, the neutral lawyer, as legal expert, can free the
parties from dependence upon typical norms of the legal process
and constraints of the adversarial system by suggesting solutions
201. Riskin, supra note 55.
202. See id. at 353-54.
203. See id. at 333. Riskin observes that:
For the individual lawyer, a neutral position offers the potential of freedom from the
constraints of the usual adversary role and the chance to help empower people to deal
with their own problems. In helping people resolve their disputes in a more responsi-
ble and humane way, the lawyer may herself derive satisfactions not available in ad-
versary practice.
Id. at 332.
204. Id. at 335.
205. Id. at 336.
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that best fit the needs of the participants. 0 s The lawyer, to the
best of his ability, can identify the essential legal issues and pre-
dict what a judge would do in a given situation.20 7 Having informed
the parties of the law, the neutral lawyer must encourage the par-
ties to trust each other in order to arrive at a mutual agreement.
Riskin suggests that mediation by a neutral lawyer "reduce[s] the
need for and influence of lawyers on the individual parties. This
may enable the parties to reach their own agreement and free them
from the adversarial/materialistic perspective, the 'lawyers' stan-
dard philosophical map.' "208
C. Riskin's Fairness Value
Riskin proposes that the neutral lawyer be guided by the princi-
ple values of fairness and maximization. 0 9 The standard of fair-
ness contemplates what society views as fair.210 This is usually re-
flected in judicial opinions which analyze and reconcile traditional
societal norms and new patterns of familial relationships.211 The
fairness element also takes into account the participants' own
sense of fairness.212 This concept of fairness certainly takes into
account notions of due process and procedural fairness. 21 3 Finally,
206. Id.
207. Riskin points out, however, that:
It is often difficult for lawyers to make clear predictions of what courts would do.
Even where the neutral lawyer can make clear predictions, the parties may have diffi-
culty perceiving her as neutral. In some cases, the best way for the neutral lawyer to
inform the parties of their rights is to tell them what she thinks they would be told
by individual lawyers. Often this will satisfy the needs of the parties, thus saving legal
fees and, perhaps, avoiding unnecessary conflict.
Id.
208. Id. at 335-36.
209. See id. at 353-59.
210. Id. at 354.
211. See LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983) (household services of the stay-
at-home spouse to be valued when considering property distribution); Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (standard for child custody determination based on which parent
is the primary caretaker); see also Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(wife should have been compensated for her contribution to marriage), cert. dismissed, 307
So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1975).
212. Riskin, supra note 55, at 354-55. Some commentators suggest that the common goal
of fairness begins with the first phone call where:
one can restrict the content of the first telephone conversation to general topics that
would subsequently be addressed (e.g., are there children, will support need to be
considered), and emphasize that fairness to each protects both from inequitable
treatment and that fair agreements are easier to comply with than unfair ones.
The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note 52, at 3029.
213. For a discussion of social realities at marital dissolution which affect the notion of
fair treatment, see Weitzman, supra note 37, at 1241.
FACILITATIVE ETHICS
the fairness value considers the interests of unrepresented third
parties such as children or future and former spouses.
21 4
The legal requirement of fairness is reflected in cases concerning
property distribution. The principle of equitable distribution was
developed in recognition of the fact that the marital unit is indeed
a joint endeavor.215 "The new concept of the marriage relation im-
plicit in the so-called 'no-fault' divorce law. . . places both parties
to the marriage on a basis of complete equality as partners sharing
equal rights and obligations in the marriage relationship and shar-
ing equal burdens in the event of dissolution. '216 At marital disso-
lution, it was only fair to treat property acquired during the mar-
riage as if it belonged to both partners, irrespective of which one
had legal title.217 Yet on the other hand, if one spouse used her
financial resources acquired before the marriage to assist in the
purchase of the marital abode, fairness demands a recognition of
her "special equity" in that property which must be recompensed
at marital dissolution. 18 Similarly, if she contributed money, prop-
erty or industry to the enhancement of separate property owned
by her husband, it is also fair to grant her a "special equity" in his
separate property.
219
214. See Riskin, supra note 55, at 354; see also The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra
note 52, at 3035-37.
215. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Brown, 300 So. 2d 719.
216. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
217. The court emphasized that its policy was not grounded upon principles of commu-
nity property, but on basic fairness; a dissolution award should be sufficient to compensate
the wife for her contribution to the marriage. "We recognize that a trial court need not
equalize the financial position of the parties. However, a trial judge must ensure that neither
spouse passes automatically from misfortune to prosperity or from prosperity to misfortune,
and, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, one spouse should not be 'shortchanged'."
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204.
218. See Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1983). In Landay the wife contributed
41% of the purchase price of the marital home from her separate property. Id. This created
a percentage ratio of her separate property contribution to the total purchase price. Id. at
1198. The court held the following:
We are of the opinion that the percentage ratio approach adopted by the district
court is the fairest one. It recognizes that the spouse who furnishes some but not all
of the consideration for property has, in effect, made a capital investment, which
should give the contributing spouse an enhanced interest in the property. Having
invested his or her capital in the property, the contributing spouse should be permit-
ted to reap the fruits of such investment, if any.
Id. at 1199.
219. The doctrine of special equities was primarily a device used to return to the wife
her economic contributions to property titled in her husband, and avoid the unfairness of
the rule that an adulterous wife should receive no alimony. In Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla.
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D. Riskin's Maximization Value
The maximization value sets out to garner the parties' resources
and stretch them as far as possible.22 ° Financial resources, in par-
ticular, are strained at family dissolution.221 Resources should not
be squandered on inefficient legal battles. The neutral lawyer can
help the parties marshall their resources in a way which maximizes
their collective ability to take care of legal familial obligations.222
Accordingly, the resolution of custody and financial issues
should be accomplished with flexible permanence.223 For example,
child support should be payable directly to the court or a state
1071, 138 So. 796 (1931) the court found:
There is undoubted proof that the wife materially assisted the husband in the con-
duct of his business of operating a chain of stores and that she put into her husband's
business a substantial amount of her own capital in addition to what personal ser-
vices she rendered. Whatever consequences the wife may be compelled under the law
to suffer for her marital derelictions by the severance of the bonds of matrimony, she
is not required to incur the forfeiture of any of her already vested equitable property
rights which were acquired by her while the matrimonial barque was sailing on
smoother seas.
Id. at 1075, 138 So. at 797; see also Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197; Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197;
Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976); Brown, 300 So. 2d 719.
220. See Riskin, supra note 55, at 358-59.
221. Id.
222. Id. Lynn Jordan and Paul Nathan, in describing mediation as a more positive ap-
proach to marital dissolution, expressed the following conceptualization of maximization:
The purpose of this article is to show ways in which a separating or divorcing
couple can be encouraged to cooperate and design solutions based on needs, abilities,
and aptitudes, rather than on fault and blame. Resolutions derived from strength will
be more vital and longlasting than those arrived at through weakness and fault.
Moreover, this method both addresses immediate needs and also helps the couple to
look forward to separate and independent features through its practical orientation
and commitment to maximizing opportunities for all parties in the years to come. It
thereby enables the couple to continue their relationship as parents in as positive and
respectful a way as possible.
The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note 52, at 3029. For a discussion of property and
support, see id. at 3034-37.
223. Jordan and Nathan take a long-term view of the agreement arrived at through me-
diation. They suggest the following:
In sum, as with support, we let the needs of the children and the practical require-
ments of the situation guide the discussion. We start with areas of agreement,
whether it be the parents' shared desires for the children to have contact with grand-
parents, play softball, attend a certain school. By the time we reach a difficult sub-
ject, much of the topic is already resolved in a way satisfactory to both and people
generally are eager to bring the matter to conclusion. By stressing that both parents
are concerned and will be involved regardless of the details of the agreement and that
changes will need to be made as the children and the situation age, we can encourage
flexibility and the occasional concession.
The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note 52, at 3037.
FACILITATIVE ETHICS
administered child advocate office.224 This relieves the custodial
parent of the burden of being a support enforcer, making frequent,
costly trips to court when support payments are delinquent. A sup-
port agreement might also recognize the inflation factor. 25 The
amount of support can then go up or down depending on the needs
of the children and ability of the supporting spouse to pay, while
encouraging self-sufficiency.226 These devices minimize the likeli-
hood of relitigating the vital obligation of child support and maxi-
mize the resources of the parties.
E. Beyond Fairness and Maximization: The Facilitative Value
The values of fairness and maximization are excellent principles
to guide the conduct of a lawyer in the family law setting. How-
ever, these two values only indirectly address the keystone princi-
ple-that the family lawyer is to facilitate the fulfillment of the
client's moral and legal family obligation.227
Much of a spouse's identity is tied up in the marital relationship.
Divorce is a reorganization of that fundamental relationship. The
lawyer who must work within it should promote the preservation
of a spouse's identity as well as the fulfillment of post-marital obli-
gations. This is the essence of the mediating lawyer's facilitative
duty and it assumes that clients with unresolved family disputes
basically seek to fulfill those family moral commitments as re-
flected in family law. It also assumes that individuals in need of
dispute resolution are consulting a trained professional who can
fairly and impartially help them realign their legal relationship.
The individuals' deepest desire is that in the relationship realign-
ment they will maximize their limited resources as well as the po-
224. See, e.g., 42 U.S.CA § 602 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); 231 PA. CODE § 1910.22
(19-); W. VA. CODE § 48A-2-13 (1986).
225. Franks, How to Calculate Child Support, 86 CASE & CoM. 3 (1981).
226. New pension planning techniques should facilitate pension planning. See generally,
Pension Evaluation and Equitable Distribution, 10 FAM. L. ReP. (BNA) [hereinafter Pen-
sion Evaluation] (Nov. 22, 1983).
227. It is, after all, the legal rights of the client that the lawyer is dealing with, and this
point provides a seldom-used key for resolving the client conundrums the lawyer so
often faces. Since the law of legal ethics is derivative in nature, being derived from
the positive law defining the rights and duties of the client, the lawyer's rights and
duties as lawyer in acting for a client are derivative in nature. The lawyer's job is not
only to aid the client in the implementation of his rights but also in the fulfillment of
his duties. [He can properly exercise only such rights and fulfill only such duties as
the client has.]
L. PATTERSON, supra note 197, § 8.01, at 8-1 to -2.
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tential for whatever post-resolution relationships continue to exist,
especially the relationship between parent and child. Therefore,
the lawyer who mediates is obligated to facilitate that desire.
The facilitation principle further assumes that what is at stake is
a significant change in the way attorneys practice in the family law
setting. The neutral lawyer's ethical conduct should embody his
new role as facilitator of family dispute resolution which society
has demanded of the profession. In restructuring family relation-
ships, the attorney should not minimize the parties' legal responsi-
bilities nor try to maximize individual personal benefits to the fi-
nancial emotional detriment of the other spouse. Such a course of
conduct has a negative effect on marital partners as well as on the
very fabric of society.
22 8
VII. CRITIQUE OF THE MEDIATION STANDARDS
It is hoped that the application of the principles discussed in
Section VI to the proposed mediation standards will inject a differ-
ent perspective into the current debate on the usefulness of the
standards. This section will evaluate the mediation standards in
terms of the four broad areas of conduct covered by the standards:
(1) rules for the mediation process, (2) responsibilities of the par-
ticipants, (3) responsibilities of the mediator, and (4) responsibili-
ties of outside professionals.
A. The Mediation Process
Mediation creates ethical responsibilities that promote the pu-
rity of the mediation process itself.229 Certainly, facilitative ethics
are not inconsistent with the goals of mediation as set forth in the
preambles of the mediation standards. Mediation by individuals
seeking to fulfill family legal and moral obligations is promoted if
"[m]ediation is based on .. .the needs and interests of the par-
ticipants, fairness, privacy self-determination, and the best inter-
ests of all family members."2 S These goals are also reflected in
Riskin's fairness and maximization values.
The nature of mediation suggests that the mediator stands in a
228. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
229. See Lande, Mediation Paradigms and Professional Identities, 4 MEDIATION Q. 19
(1984).
230. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble.
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fiduciary relationship to the parties.2"' The mediator must exercise
due care in handling the couple's relationship realignment. The
mediator, in his zeal for mediation, should not force the process on
unwilling and ill-prepared parties.2 32 The success of the mediation
process should not be measured by the number of agreements
achieved, but rather in terms which recognize the humanity of the
participants. Minimization of psychic and emotional damage is the
hallmark of an effective mediation process and a goal toward which
all mediators should strive.23 3
Two major features of the mediation standards promote the
facilitative approach. First, the standards demand that the media-
tor take primary responsibility for educating the participants as to
how mediation works. Successful mediation is contingent upon in-
formed participation. The mediator must fully describe the
mechanics of the process and the mediator's role within the pro-
cess.2 34 Second, the educational process is incomplete without
drawing information from the participants themselves and evaluat-
ing which issues are suited for discussion.235
The mediator must be aware that individuals have varying levels
of education, intelligence and emotional stability. The mediator's
fiduciary duty is to protect the process and the participants by re-
peating the ground rules, if necessary, and being receptive to
questions.236
The standards do not adequately encourage the mediator to edu-
cate the participants on their legal and moral obligations. The
rules suggest that the mediator may impart some information, but
231. Those who engage in the practice of mediation must be dedicated to the principle
that all disputants have a right to negotiate and attempt to determine the outcome of
their own conflicts. They must be aware that their duties and obligations relate to the
parties who engage their services, to the mediation process, to other mediators, to the
agencies which administer the practice of mediation, and to the general public.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Preamble (Center for Dispute Resolution
1982), reprinted in J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 349.
232. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard I(C); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standard I(A)(1); see also Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note 164.
233. See generally, GARDNER, supra note 26; J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 51.
234. See generally, AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standards I, VIII; ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 1, Standard I; see also Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note 164.
235. "The mediator shall elicit sufficient information from the participants so that they
can mutually define and agree on the issues to be resolved in mediation." AFCC STANDARDS,
supra note 1, Standard I(B); see also Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note 164.
236. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV(B); see also AFCC STANDARDS,
supra note 1, Standard VII; Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note 164.
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should encourage the participants to obtain outside counsel as the
primary source of legal information. The ABA Standards propose
the following:
I
B. [T]he mediator shall promote the equal understanding of such
information before any agreement is reached. This consideration
may require the mediator to recommend that either or both obtain
expert consultation in the event that it appears that additional
knowledge or understanding is necessary for balanced negotiation.
C. The mediator (who is a lawyer) may define the legal issues. The
lawyer-mediator shall not direct the decision of the mediation par-
ticipants based upon the lawyer-mediator's interpretation of the law
as applied to the facts of the situation. The mediator shall endeavor
to assure that the participants have a sufficient understanding of ap-
propriate statutory and case law as well as local judicial tradition,
before reaching an agreement by recommending to the participants
that they obtian independent legal representation during the
process. 3
7
What information and knowledge does the mediator impart? For
what aspects of the mediation does the mediator advise use of
outside counsel as the information source? If the participants do
consult outside counsel, how is the mediator to judge whether the
participants have been fully informed on all legal issues? By what
standard will the mediator judge the fairness of the process and
the reasonableness of the agreement, unless all agree on the pa-
rameters of the family obligations set out by the law?2 38
The facilitative mediator has a duty to educate the parties con-
cerning their legal and moral obligations as articulated by the law
and judicial precedent. Otherwise there is not common ground for
discussion, nor an understanding of where the law allows some give
and take. These issues are addressed in greater depth in Part C of
this section.
237. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV; see also Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note
164.
238. The ABA Standards suggest the following standard of fairness: "The mediator has
a duty to assure a balanced dialogue and must attempt to diffuse any manipulative or intim-
idating negotiation techniques utilized by either of the participants." ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 1, Standard V(E).
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B. Ethical Responsibilities of the Participants
The second area of broad ethical consideration in the mediation
standards is the responsibilities of the participants. A humane me-
diation process requires the participants to refrain from manipula-
tion and intimidation tactics.239 Because emotions are a factor in
marital breakups, the participants must understand "the connec-
tion between one's own emotions and the bargaining process."
2 40
They must not let emotions hinder them from freely disclosing all
facts and circumstances necessary for the complete resolution of
the issues.241 The process requires the participants to hold confi-
dential all information disclosed during mediation and to refrain
from using that information if a subsequent adversarial proceeding
becomes necessary.
242
The biggest responsibility the parties owe to each other is a will-
ingness to accept the outcome of their own resolution. The stan-
dards assume that "[t]he primary responsibility for the resolution
of a dispute rests with the participants. '243 Implicit in this as-
sumption is the notion that the participants know or can find out
what their legal and moral responsibilities are.
C. The Ethics of the Mediator
The responsibilities of the mediator are grounded in the notion
of self-determination by the participants. The mediator stands as
the neutral, impartial referee whose responsbility is to inform the
parties of their rights and obligations and to negotiate a dissolu-
tion of their relationship. During the process the mediator must
remain impartial and neutral, two concepts that the mediation
standards emphasize.244 However, they are at times inconsistent
when evaluated with other provisions. Moreover, the ABA Stan-
239. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VIII(A); ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 1, Standard V(E).
240. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard V(D).
241. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard V; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standards I(A)(2), IV(A); see also Advisory 0 p. 86-8, supra note 164.
242. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard IV; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1,
Standards II, III(F), VI(B), VI(C).
243. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VI(A); see also AFCC STANDARDS, supra
note 1, Preamble; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble.
244. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II; ABA STANDARDS supra note 1, Stan-
dard III; see also Advisory Op. 86-8, supra note 164.
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dards and the AFCC Standards define impartiality differently.2" A
fuller analysis of these concepts is undertaken in light of the
facilitative principle.
The AFCC Standard II, ABA Standard III, and Proposed Advi-
sory Opinion 86-8 require the mediator to be neutral. Neutrality is
a straightforward concept because it resembles more traditional
notions of ethical behavior by attorneys seeking to avoid conflicts
of interest.246 For instance, the lawyer may not mediate a dissolu-
tion if he has previously represented one of the participants in any
matter.2 47 Nor may he represent a participant in a subsequent ad-
versarial divorce proceeding. 248 The lawyer should also disclose any
personal or professional biases and any potential conflicts of
interest.
249
The mediation standards also impose a duty of impartiality.2 50
An impartial mediator directs the process but does not advocate a
particular solution or favor one participant over another. The im-
partiality concept of the mediation standards is similar to Riskin's
concept of neutral lawyering.251 Specifically, the AFCC Standard II
states the following:
A. Impartiality
The mediator is obligated to maintain impartiality toward all par-
ticipants. Impartiality means freedom from favoritism or bias either
in word or action. Impartiality implies a commitment to aid all par-
ticipants, as opposed to a single individual, in reaching a mutually
satisfactory agreement. Impartiality means that a mediator will not
play an adversarial role.
The mediator has a responsibility to maintain impartiality while
raising questions for the parties to consider as to the fairness, eq-
uity, and feasibility of proposed options for settlement.252
245. Compare ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard III(D) with AFCC STANDARDS,
supra note 1, Standard II(A).
246. "A lawyer-mediator shall not represent either party during or after the mediation
process in any legal matters. In the event the mediator has represented one of the parties
beforehand, the mediator shall not undertake the mediation." ABA STANDARDS, supra note
1, Standard III(A); see also AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II(B); Advisory Op.
86-8, supra note 164 (using the term impartial instead of neutral when referring to prior or
subsequent representation).
247. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
249. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard III(C); AFCC STANDARDS, supra note
1, Standard I(D)(1); see also supra text accompanying notes 151-61.
250. See AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II(A).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 201-08.
252. AFCC STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II(A).
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ABA Standard IV-(C) suggests that the mediator should play a
limited role in the substantive discussions between the
participants:
C. The mediator who is a lawyer may define the legal issues. The
lawyer-mediator shall not direct the decision of the mediation par-
ticipants based upon the lawyer-mediator's interpretation of the
law as applied to the facts of the situation. The mediator shall en-
deavor to assure that the participants have a sufficient understand-
ing of appropriate statutory and case law as well as local judicial
tradition, before reaching an agreement by recommending to the
participants that they obtain independent legal representation dur-
ing the process.253
A question remains as to how a mediator can judge the fairness
of the parties' agreement if he is not allowed to apply his interpre-
tation of the law to the facts. Unfortunately, none of the proposed
standards directly informs outside legal advisors of their ethical
responsibilities.254
There must be an accommodation between complete impartial-
ity on the one hand and protection from unfairness and unreasona-
bleness on the other. Bishop proposes a recognition of this tension:
[T]he divorce mediator is not truly impartial in all instances.
While the mediator should not direct the participants to one result
or another, objective fairness is a desirable element of any mediated
divorce agreement. There appears to be a conflict between the
promises of mediation in this case. In this view, mediation is an em-
powering process in which the couple has the responsibility and ulti-
mate authority for self-determination. Alternatively, mediation is of-
fered as a process that yields objective fairness and is consistent
with the best interests of children.
255
The mediation process, therefore, necessarily generates a frame-
253. Id. Standard IV(C) (emphasis added).
254. See infra text accompanying notes 283-86.
255. Bishop, supra note 55, at 10. Bishop suggests that "Itihe mediator who promotes
reason is not impartial," particularly when addressing the needs of the participants'
children.
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work of ethical practice. In attempting to facilitate a dissolution
agreement, the "impartial" mediator cannot help being drawn into
the tension created by the bargaining between the participants.
25 6
The facilitative mediator is not a passive observer, but instead ed-
ucates participants on the nature of the process and evaluates the
participants' willingness and capacity to engage in mediation. Edu-
cation and evalution must include the principles of fairness, max-
imization and facilitation.5
Lande, in considering the premise that mediation suggests a
framework of ethical behavior, describes the mediation process as
"an expression of a set of positive values about how people should
deal with one another."2 58 Lande reviews the proposed ABA Stan-
dards by applying Thomas Kuhn's "concept of revolutionary para-
digm shift" to the adversary system of marital dissolution and to
mediation.259 Lande offers this assessment of how ethical behavior
in mediation might be conceived in Kuhn's terms:
Mediation is a paradigm that can lead to a peaceful and evolu-
tionary revolution in the way people think and act in general. Kuhn
256. The process and implications of bargaining is discussed in Dibble, Bargaining in
Family Mediation: Ethical Considerations, 4 MEDIATION Q. 75 (1984). In considering
whether bargaining over the "common goods" of the marital relationship increases adver-
sarial conflict or promotes a fair resolution of marital dissolution, Dibble notes:
Bargaining would hardly be necessary if mediators were consistently able to re-
frame issues from conflictual, distributive disputes to cooperative, integrative
projects. The problem of how to cut the pie persists, however, even when the pie can
be enlarged. The question about bargaining is whether it is an adequate and appro-
priate means of dealing with the difficult issues of distribution and distributive jus-
tice in mediating family conflicts.
Id. at 76-77.
Dibble concludes that bargaining is appropriate for mediation if it "emphasize(s] open,
mutual, and relatively prolonged communication," and assists the participants in the
"movement toward agreement," and if the "bargainers are equals in a joint decision-making
process." Id. at 89-90.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 196-228.
258. Lande, supra note 229, at 19.
259. Id. (citing T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)).
Lande proposes a strategy for engaging in a continuing discourse on ethical behavior for
mediators. See generally id. at 39-46. Lande concludes:
Mediation is the new paradigm that is succeeding the old ideology of adversary
advocacy. Because revolutions are not self-executing, we, in the currently amorphous
mediation community, must take responsibility for developing the next paradigm
consensus according to the values and beliefs of our evolving paradigm. Just as medi-
ation requires active participation of disputants, the development of the mediation
movement requires the active participation of movement members to face our chal-
lenges, establish our priorities, and make the necessary commitments.
Id. at 42.
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defines paradigms as both 'entire constellation(s) of belief, values,
techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community'
and also 'one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puz-
zle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace
explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of
normal science.' The mediation paradigm is based on affirmative
principles designed to fulfill the ideals of the adversary paradigm,
[individuality, autonomy, responsibility, and dignity], but which en-
courages people to act on their best, rather than worst, motivations
and thus to provide more satisfying results.26 0
At least two lessons may be drawn from Lande's work which
supplement a critique of the proposed standards. First, the values
which form the essence of mediation aid the quest for mediation
ethics.26 ' Second, the mediation process provides the solution to
the puzzle of impartiality. If the nature of the impartiality puzzle
is understood, an understanding of appropriate mediator conduct
should follow.
Sidney Bernard, Joseph Folger, Helen Weingarten and Zena
Zumeta in their collaborative article, The Neutral Mediator: Value
Dilemmas in Divorce Mediation, articulate a promising solution to
the problem of impartiality, by considering how mediators practice
their craft. 6 2 The authors posit that there is a range of settlement
strategies used by mediators which define the mediator's role and
thus the proper level of impartiality.2 3 The Neutral Mediator sug-
gests the following view of mediation models:
[S]ettlement strategies can be said to differ according to their loca-
tion along a continuum between two polar positions-neutrality and
intervention. A neutralist strategy involves seeking to avoid influ-
encing the outcome of the negotiations between the parties. Any de-
cision the parties freely agree on is seen as acceptable in the extreme
neutralist position. An interventionist position, in contrast, finds the
mediator actively challenging and possibl[y] even refusing to accept
an agreement both parties have accepted. The interventionist medi-
ator who believes an agreement is unfair or unjust is likely to pre-
sent alternatives designed to achieve the mediator's vision of the
parties' best interests.
2'
260. Id. at 19-20 (quoting T. KUHN, supra note 258.
261. See id. at 23-25.
262. Bernard, Folger, Weingarten & Zuneta, The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in
Divorce Mediation, 4 MEDIATION Q. 61 (1984) [hereinafter The Neutral Mediator].
263. Id. at 62.
264. Id.
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The purely neutral mediator, then, helps the process happen,
but lets the participants freely craft their own settlement agree-
ment.265 As long as the process works, the mediator should demon-
strate pure impartiality and not attempt to sway the outcome or
interject his viewpoint. 6 Quite obviously, the interventionist me-
diator would not be reluctant to employ a hands on approach
guided by his professional experience and personal views.267 The
interventionist mediator "can shape the process or the outcome de-
pending on how it is presented by the mediator or interpreted by
the parties.
'26 8
Between these two extremes is a mid-range strategy favored by
The Neutral Mediator:
269
[There] are such alternatives as option-enhancing and empower-
ment-through-information strategies. In the option-enhancing strat-
egy, the mediator directly suggests alternatives to the solutions pro-
posed by the parties. In the empowerment strategy, the mediator
provides various information, legal requirements, child development
needs, and the experience of others in the divorce and divorce ad-
justment process; this information can increase the knowledge of the
participants, suggest to them alternative settlements, and may even
balance the power between the parties.2 7 0
265. Id. at 65-66.
266. Id. The mediator may recommend a different settlement or observe unequal bar-
gaining power. If the mediator does not intervene, "[h]is basic position is that the media-
tor's job is to make the parties realize that their best interests will be served only if they
achieve a negotiated settlement. His goal is to make 'the lion-lamb relationship clear to the
lamb."' Id. (citing H. BELLMAN, MEDIATION AS AN APPROACH TO REsOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL
DispuTEs, Proceedings of the Environment Conflict Management Practitioners Workshop 3-
4 (1982)).
267. "A divorce mediator who urges the parties to rethink the directions or the terms of
a settlement has adopted an interventionist settlement strategy. The mediator may draw on
a professional knowledge base or a personal value stance to justify asking the parties to
reshape a settlement." Id. at 63.
268. Id. at 66. This role of interventionist may be particularly evident in the lawyer-
mediator who is steeped in the adversary system. See generally Lande, supra note 229, at
20-23. Chang suggests that "[t]he core of the problem is professionalism; the lawyer is the
expert who serves the client's needs, but often as the lawyer sees them, not as the client sees
them." Chang, supra note 48, at 120.
269. The Neutral Mediator, supra note 262, at 66; see also The Carrot Instead of the
Stick, supra note 52, at 3029. Chang also favors the mid-range strategy. She suggests that
mediation works best if, "[e]ach client must justify his goals to the other, with the mediator
as a facilitator, an impartial guide to the negotiation, a balancer of power, and a provider of
perspective." Chang, supra note 48, at 128.
270. The Neutral Mediator, supra note 262, at 65.
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Herein lies one possible solution to the impartiality puzzle. A
deeper look at the proposed mediation standards reveals option-
enhancing and empowering strategies. For example, the proposed
standards emphasize the importance of encouraging participants to
seek the advice of outside counsel 1.2 7  Additionally, the proposed
standards require the mediator to ensure that the participants
have sufficient legal and factual information.27 2 Furthermore, it is
implicit in the proposed standards that in describing how the me-
diation process operates, the mediator should let the participants
know in advance that at different times during the mediation vary-
ing levels of intervention may be required.
273
Knowing where one stands on the intervention continuum, and
thus how impartial the mediator must be is largely a question of
the personal values of the mediator,274 and his awareness of cur-
rent practice in the mediation profession.275 However, the option-
enhancement and empowering process can best be accomplished if
the participants take full advantage of the lawyer-mediator's train-
ing, experience and wisdom. The mediator should empower the
271. See id. at 66.
272. Id. at 65.
273. Id. The Neutral Mediator provides an excellent example of how intervention was
used to enhance the options of one mediation participant who had agreed to a property
settlement granting him 20% of the property and his spouse 80%. The property was a radio
station which the wife managed and which employed the husband. The authors describe the
intervention of the husband:
The mediator felt strongly that the agreement giving the wife 80 percent of the
property was unfair to the husband. The mediator, a lawyer, knew that the law in the
couple's state mandated equitable distribution of property and that the courts would
assume a fifty-fifty division of assets. Since the wife had custody of the children and
had inherited part of the assets, she could receive more than 50 percent from a liti-
gated disposition, but 80 percent was highly unlikely. The mediator asked the hus-
band to hire an attorney to gain some advice, but the husband refused. The husband
insisted that the settlement was satisfactory to him. The mediator was aware of the
importance to him of not alienating his wife and maintaining some dependency on
her.
Id. at 63-64.
In this example, after continued insistence by the mediator and the wife's encouragement,
the husband obtained independent counsel. The couple settled on a split of 65% for the
wife, and 35% for the husband. Id. at 64.
274. See id. at 67-70. But see Lande, supra note 229, at 39-41 (suggesting that the pro-
posed ABA Standards actually discourage the expression of the mediator's personal values).
275. See The Neutral Mediator, supra note 262, at 70-71; Lande, supra note 229, at 41-
46.
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participants' quest for self-determination by laying out a legal
analysis of their factual situation.
Impartiality implies an important, active role for the mediator.
The mediator has the ethical duty to guarantee fairness and
reasonableness.
Fairness is always an issue in property distribution. For exam-
ple, generally a retirement pension will be classified as marital
property subject to distribution 76 Even though the pension itself
is not presently available for distribution, courts recognize that the
acquisition of the pension was a valuable contractual right earned
by the employee-spouse during marriage. 7 How does one compen-
sate the non-working spouse who had an expectation of sharing in
this marital asset at retirement? Should he or she be compensated
at all? It is the mediator's responsibility to resolve this issue
fairly. 8
Reasonableness is always an issue in setting child custody ar-
rangements. ABA Standard III limits impartiality by requiring the
participants and the mediator to consider the interest of chil-
dren.279 For example, is joint custody a viable alternative?2 0 What
is the likelihood that each parent will accommodate the other par-
ent in maintaining access to the children?281' Clearly, a custodial
arrangement which mandates transferring physical custody of the
children on alternating weeks may not be reasonable for all par-
ents. The mediator's responsibility in this case would be to help
design a more workable solution, considering, among other factors,
the domiciles of both parties and their personal inclinations.282
D. The Ethics of the Outside Legal Advisor
The proposed standards impose a continuing duty on the media-
tor "to advise each of the mediation participants to obtain legal
276. See Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986); see also Pension Evalu-
ation, supra note 226, at 3001.
277. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d at 265.
278. Courts have the power to treat the pension as a marital asset which can be distrib-
uted as lump sum alimony. The courts may use the future receipt of pension payments to
assess the ability of that spouse to pay permanent, periodic or rehabilitative alimony to a
financially needy spouse. Id. at 268.
279. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard III(E).
280. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1987).
281. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
282. See generally GARDNER, supra note 26.
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review prior to reaching any agreement."28 3 Bishop suggests that,
"[w]hile most mediation participants choose this route to avoid the
acrimony, anxiety, and dehumanizing aspects of litigation, most
are nevertheless interested in protecting themselves and in being
fair to themselves and their former spouses. 28 4
It is unclear, however, how the mediator should interact with the
mediation process. Bishop argues that the advisor should offer le-
gal advice which will enhance the mediation process. He says:
In marital dissolution, legal entitlements are highly particularized.
While legal counsel is ostensibly objective, it can result only from
the presentation of each spouse's perspective on the marriage. The
term advice, in this regard, is sometimes misunderstood to mean
gladiatorial exhortation. It is used here to mean, instead, particular-
ized information. There is no place in the mediation process for the
lawyer who would pressure the mediation participant to draw a par-
ticular conclusion. It is important for the lawyer who, after evaluat-
ing the client's information, can give that person an understanding
of his or her entitlements and jeopardies.
2 5
This is consistent with the facilitative approach. The role of the
outside counsel should not be adversarial. His ethical responsibili-
ties are well directed by Rule 2.1, Advisor, of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation.
'286
VIII. CONCLUSION
The principle task of the divorce process and the divorce lawyer
should be to facilitate the establishment of financial, social and
emotional security for the parties to the greatest extent practica-
ble. The present codes of conduct do not allow attorneys to employ
a facilitative approach to practice. If the law is designed to facili-
tate the discharge of familial obligations, the lawyer's skills should
283. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard VI; see also AFCC STANDARDS, supra note
1, Standard VII.
284. Bishop, supra note 55, at 10; see also Bishop, supra note 103, at 464.
285. Bishop, supra note 55, at 8.
286. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, Rule 4-2.1 (West Supp. 1987).
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be used to facilitate these duties also. However, the lawyer is still
faced with many ethical dilemmas, guidance for which is in an em-
bryonic state.
The principles discussed above create an ethical framework for
the lawyer who practices mediation. Facilitative ethics call for
open, informed communications between parties guided by the
positive involvement of the lawyer-mediator. The lawyer should
not tolerate antagonism and should be fully supported in this by
the family court. In the absence of critical reasons such as a social
report of parental unfitness or fraud in property procurement, liti-
gation should be the last resort-especially to the party mali-
ciously initiating continued legal strife. Through mediation the di-
vorce process then becomes one of reconciliation.287  The
participants strive to heal the wounds of individuals "rent asun-
der" and the wounds inflicted on society by the breakup of soci-
ety's fundamental unit.2"" The participants in mediation leave the
marital relationship empowered to fulfill the primary legal obliga-
tions imposed by the state.289
287. See generally Weaver, Therapeutic Implications of Divorce Mediation, 12 MEDIA-
TION Q. 75 (1986).
288. See generally Saunders, The Social Consequences of Divorce: Implications for
Family Policy, 6 J. DIvoacE 1 (1983).
289. Indeed we wish to make a subtle plea for the serious consideration of the use of
mediation, but more importantly we wish to encourage the cooperation between sepa-
rating and divorcing spouses, which inevitably means each making a number of con-
cessions that benefit the other in order that they reach realistic compromises that can
bear the test of time.
The Carrot Instead of the Stick, supra note 52, at 3038.
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